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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OUTSIDE THE CANON 
 
Todd S. Aagaard* 
 
It is time to rethink the domination of environmental law by a canon of 
major federal environmental statutes enacted in the 1970s. Environmental 
law is in a malaise. Despite widespread agreement that existing laws are 
inadequate to address current environmental problems, Congress has not 
passed a major environmental statute in more than twenty years. If it is to 
succeed, the environmental law of this new century may need to evolve 
into something that looks quite different than the extant environmental law 
canon. The next generation of environmental laws must be viable for 
creation and implementation even in an antagonistic political climate; 
amenable to integration with other, non-environmental law; and able to 
make inroads against the monumental peril of global climate change. 
Environmental laws embedded in larger non-environmental programs and 
dispersed throughout government offer an alternative model to the 
environmental law canon—an alternative model that seems well suited to 
help environmental law address these daunting challenges. 
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Environmental law has a clear canon of statutes that attract the 
bulk of attention in environmental law cases, courses, and treatises.  The 
canon consists of four major anti-pollution statutes administered by the 
Environmental Protection Agency—the Clean Air Act1; Clean Water 
Act
2
; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA)3; and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA)4—along with two other statutes, the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA)5 and Endangered Species Act (ESA).6  Congress 
enacted the statutes comprising the canon in the 1970s, during what has 
been called the Environmental Law Revolution.7  At the time, 
environmental protection was a bipartisan issue, and the major 
environmental statutes were enacted with “sweeping majorities” and 
“lopsided votes.”8  The new statutes were highly ambitious in their aims, 
consistent with the idea that a revolution was indeed at hand.9 
                                                 
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q. 
2  33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387. 
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. 
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k. 
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h. 
6 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1599. 
7 See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Participation in the Era of Reinvention: 
The Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 717 (1999); Robert L. 
Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in the 
Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 720 (2008); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: 
Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical 
Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1459 (1996); see also Robert V. 
Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 159, 165 n.30 (1997) (“[T]here can be no doubt about the revolutionary nature 
of the legislation.”). 
8 See Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of "Republican Moment" in Environmental 
Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 999, 1002, 1003 n.17 (2003); see also Richard N.L. Andrews, 
The EPA at 40: An Historical Perspective, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 223, 224 
(2011) (noting that in the early 1970s “solidly bipartisan majorities [in Congress] vested 
this new agency [EPA] with sweeping new powers”); Percival, supra note 7, at 165 
(1997) (noting that the major environmental statutes of the 1970s were enacted with  
“overwhelming, bipartisan support”). 
9 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (declaring that “it is the 
national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 
1985”); Clean Air Act § 109(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1) (directing EPA to publish 
proposed regulations prescribing air quality standards within thirty days of the statute’s 
enactment); see generally RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
67-73 (2004). 
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In the decades since the Environmental Law Revolution, however, 
the optimism that imbued the canonical environmental statutes has faded.  
Environmental law suffers from a “mid-life crisis,”10 or at least a 
“malaise.”11  Environmental lawmaking in Congress has stagnated.  
Despite widespread agreement that inadequacies exist in the canonical 
environmental law statutes, Congress has not passed a major 
environmental statute since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.  Both 
parties have failed in attempts to pass their key environmental legislative 
initiatives,12 and bipartisan legislative efforts on environmental issues 
have been virtually unheard of.  As the Breaking the Logjam Project has 
noted, “For almost 20 years, political polarization and a lack of leadership 
have left environmental protection in the United States burdened with 
obsolescent statutes and regulatory strategies.”13  The political climate has 
become even more acrimonious of late, as EPA has become a lightning 
rod for opponents of government regulation.14 
Meanwhile, although the canonical environmental statutes have 
resulted in some dramatic reductions in pollution,15 environmental threats 
loom large.  Many environmental harms continue relatively unregulated.16  
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Linda A. Malone, Looking Beyond Environmental Law's Mid-Life Crisis, 23 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 679, 680 (2006). 
11 Holly Doremus, Reinvigorating the Union of Wonder and Power, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
281, 282 (2005). 
12 See, e.g., EPA, Clear Skies:  Legislative Information, 
http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/legis.html (noting that the Bush Administration’s Clear 
Skies bill “never moved out of the Senate Environment and Public Works committee in 
2005 and was therefore never enacted”); Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER, 
Oct. 11, 2010 (detailing the demise of the Obama Administration’s climate change bill in 
the Senate). 
13  Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., The Breaking the Logjam Project, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 1 (2008); see also Laurie Ristino & Sam Kalen, Is Environmental Law Serving 
Society, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT., Spr. 2012, at 52, 53 (“Little doubt exists that our 
middle-aged environmental programs are shouldering challenges not particularly well-
suited to their statutory frameworks.”); William Ruckelshaus, A New Shade of Green, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2010 (commenting that “the solutions we devised back in the 1970s 
aren’t likely to make much of a dent in the environmental problems we face today,” even 
though “[c]onsiderable progress has been made thanks to those early laws”). 
14 See, e.g., Robin Bravender & Gabriel Nelson, Republicans Blitz Obama Over EPA's 
'Anti-Industrial' Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010; John M. Broder, Bashing 
E.P.A. Is New Theme in G.O.P. Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011; John M. Broder, 
House Votes to Bar E.P.A. From Regulating Industrial Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 
2011. 
15 See, e.g., EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970-1990, at ES-2 
to ES3 (1997) (reporting that the Clean Air Act reduced sulfur dioxide emissions by 40%,  
nitrogen oxides emissions by 30%, volatile organic compound emissions by 45%, carbon 
monoxide emissions by 50%, primary particulate emissions by 75%, and lead emissions 
by 99% as compared with what they otherwise would have been in 1990 without the 
Act). 
16 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 265 (2000) (noting that, despite their environmental impacts, “farms 
are virtually unregulated by the expansive body of environmental law that has developed 
in the United States in the past 30 years”). 
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New regulatory challenges arise as advancements in science identify new 
hazards.17  The threat from anthropogenic global climate change, the worst 
environmental problem in human history, continues to grow even as 
efforts to enact comprehensive climate policy seem more and more 
beyond reach.18 
Environmental law’s malaise in the face of challenges that would 
be daunting even in the best of circumstances suggests that it is an 
opportune time to investigate alternative models for environmental 
lawmaking.  To do so, however, requires rethinking the environmental law 
canon’s predominance within the field of environmental law.  
Environmental law scholarship, practice, and teaching tend to focus on the 
environmental law canon, to the neglect of other environmental laws.19 
This inattention to environmental laws outside the canon is 
understandable, because such laws do not compare to the environmental 
law canon in terms of size or prominence.  But noncanonical 
environmental laws are nevertheless an important category of 
environmental law that deserves more attention for at least three related 
reasons.  First, noncanonical environmental law has distinctive 
characteristics that cohere it as a category and differentiate it from 
canonical environmental law.  Second, noncanonical environmental law 
provides an alternative model for environmental lawmaking that may offer 
significant advantages over relying wholly on the environmental law 
canon to address the challenges currently facing environmental law.  
Third, noncanonical environmental law, because it is atypical of 
environmental law, offers unique vantage points from which to gain 
insights into the field of environmental law as a whole.  The paper 
proceeds in three parts, affiliated with these three points. 
Part I describes the topography of environmental law as a whole.  
Mapping the field expands the recognized domain of environmental law 
beyond the canon.  It also helps to identify both common and 
distinguishing characteristics of environmental law.  Although 
environmental laws share some defining characteristics, other key features 
distinguish among environmental laws.  These distinguishing features 
explain functional differences among environmental laws and define 
useful categories of environmental law.  In particular, environmental laws 
outside the canon exhibit functional characteristics that differ markedly 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Nanotechnology and the Environment: What's 
Next?,  NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 2012, at 51-52 (noting that nanotechnology is 
an “emerging industrial hazard[] requiring safety research and regulation” and the 
inadequacy of “existing applicable statutes . . . enacted at a time when the unique 
challenges of nanotechnology were not yet contemplated”). 
18 See infra Part II.E.3. 
19 Cf. Austin B. Caswell, Canonicity in Academia:  A Music Historian’s View, 25 J. 
AESTHETIC EDUC. 129, 129 (1991) (asserting that “the tyranny of canonicity” can be 
“destructive of our critical faculties”). 
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from canonical environmental law, creating possible alternatives to 
environmental law in its canonical form.20 
Part II focuses on a particular subspecies of noncanonical 
environmental law that I call embedded environmental laws.  Embedded 
environmental laws are environmental statutes or statutory provisions 
embedded within larger programs that are not primarily environmental, 
and that are usually administered by agencies not primarily engaged in 
environmental lawmaking—for example, the federal excise tax on ozone-
depleting chemicals administered by the Internal Revenue Service,21 or 
limitations on the importation of illegally harvested timber administered 
by the Agricultural Plant and Health Inspection Service.22 Embedded 
environmental laws offer an alternative model for environmental 
lawmaking that may help address some of the major challenges currently 
facing environmental law, including legislative stagnation, integration of 
environmental law with law from other fields, and policies to address 
global climate change. 
Part III explores conceptual insights that the study of noncanonical 
environmental laws can generate.  Including noncanonical environmental 
laws in the study of environmental law reveals a field that is more diverse 
in both content and history than conventional accounts of environmental 
law that focus on the canon.  Noncanonical environmental laws also can, 
by virtue of their location at the periphery of environmental law, shed light 
on some of the field’s existential issues, such as defining the boundaries of 
what regulatory objectives qualify as environmental.  Such questions have 
practical as well as theoretical import—whether a law is classified as 
environmental or some other category determines, for example, what 
congressional committee and what agency are likely to control it.  An 
examination of noncanonical environmental laws reveals that the 
boundaries of environmental law are blurry, and overlap significantly with 
                                                 
20 As Part I makes clear, environmental law includes laws at a variety of levels of 
government, from international to local.  See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.  
While acknowledging this range, this paper’s examination of environmental law outside 
the canon focuses primarily on noncanonical federal environmental law for three reasons.  
First, federal environmental statutes outside of the environmental law canon are an 
alternative readily available to the lawmaking institution (Congress) that creates the 
environmental law canon, which is composed of federal statutes.  Second, the possibility 
of state environmental regulation, because of the federalism issues it raises, has not 
suffered from the same degree of inattention that afflicts other environmental law outside 
of the canon.  Third and finally, focusing on federal environmental statutes outside of the 
canon gives the paper a more manageable scope.  That being said, state environmental 
laws, addressing issues ranging from pollution to fish and game to land use to water 
rights to renewable energy standards, exhibit a rich diversity of features and warrant 
additional scholarly examination as a category of their own. 
21 I.R.C. §§ 4681-4682; see also Janet E. Milne, Environmental Taxation in the United 
States: The Long View, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 417 (2011). 
22 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 8204, 122 Stat. 
1651, 2052-56 (2008). 
 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OUTSIDE THE CANON 6 
other fields.  The creation, study, and practice of environmental law 
should better reflect and address this messy reality. 
I. Mapping Environmental Law 
Environmental law encompasses far more law than the few federal 
statutes that comprise the environmental law canon and that predominate 
in the field.23  The field of environmental law can be classified into several 
categories based on gradations of prominence:  the canon, a subcanon of 
diminished prominence but still relatively familiar laws, and finally 
noncanonical environmental laws, which are either primarily associated 
with other fields or simply altogether obscure.  Figure 1 represents these 
categories of environmental law as a series of concentric circles, in order 
of increasing prominence as one approaches the center of the circle. 
 
                                                 
23 For the purposes this paper, the field of environmental law is defined to encompass 
laws that reflect a consideration of human impacts on the natural environment.  See Todd 
S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field:  An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95 
CORNELL L. Rev. 221, 263 (2010) (arguing in favor of this definition among several 
alternatives).  This definition is not limited to laws with the only or overriding purpose of 
protecting the environment, because environmental laws reflect a balance of objectives, 
including but not limited to environmental protection.  This definition also excludes laws 
that unintentionally affect the environment.  Even accepting this definition, however, 
laws are not necessarily susceptible to simple classification as environmental or not.  For 
example, the common law of nuisance is not aimed specifically at the environment, but it 
has important applications to remedying environmental problems.  See, e.g., N.J. Dept. of 
Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 157 (N.J. 1983) (holding under common law 
of nuisance that landowners are strictly liable for harm caused by toxic wastes stored on 
their property that flow onto the property of others); see also infra Part III (examining 
how environmental laws outside the canon help to define the scope of the field). 
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 Although all environmental laws share certain features in 
common,24 other features vary among different environmental laws.  
These differentiating features affect how the laws function.  Moreover, the 
environmental law canon shares a strong commonality of features not 
representative of the diversity of the field as a whole.  Because of 
differences in their characteristics, environmental laws outside of the 
canon do not function the same as canonical environmental laws.  These 
functional differences establish noncanonical environmental laws as a 
distinct category of environmental law, with the potential to provide an 
alternative model for environmental lawmaking. 
                                                 
24 In previous articles, I have explored the features that environmental laws share in 
common and that distinguish environmental law from other legal fields.  See Todd S. 
Aagaard, Environmental Harms, Use Conflicts, and Neutral Baselines in Environmental 
Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 1505 (2011) (hereinafter “Use Conflicts”); Aagaard, supra note 23.  
These previous articles argued that environmental lawmaking is best understood as the 
management of conflicts among uses of environmental resources.  See Aagaard, Use 
Conflicts, supra, at 1525-27; Aagaard, supra note 23, at 264-69, 275. Environmental 
resources share certain characteristics:  they are physical; they are publicly rather than 
privately valued, owned, and controlled; and they serve as media for pervasively 
interrelated ecological systems. See Aagaard, supra note 23, at 264-69. Environmental 
problems arise when potential uses of environmental resources conflict. See Aagaard, 
Use Conflicts, supra, at 1526; Aagaard, supra note 23, at 275. Moreover, the 
characteristics of resources are such that conflicts, when they arise, tend to be intense, 
complicated, and multidimensional. See Aagaard, Use Conflicts, supra, at 1527.  Here, by 
contrast to these earlier works examining commonalities among environmental laws, my 
focus is on distinguishing among environmental laws. 
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A. Differentiating Features 
Apart from the features that environmental laws share in 
common,25 other characteristics distinguish among environmental laws.  
These differentiating features include the role of environmental protection, 
the specific subject matter, the endpoints, the type of environmental 
media, the regulatory and non-regulatory mechanisms, the targets, the 
form, the implementing institution, the level of government, and the 
breadth.  Different categories of environmental law exhibit different 
patterns of these characteristics.  One of the central challenges for 
environmental lawmaking is matching the specific attributes of an 
environmental problem with the most appropriate mix of features for the 
environmental law that responds to the problem.   
Role of Environmental Protection.  Although a general goal of 
environmental protection is a feature common to all environmental laws, 
environmental protection plays varying roles in environmental laws.  
Some environmental laws are enacted primarily to protect human health 
and the environment.26  Some laws are enacted in part to protect the 
environment, but not necessarily as its primary goal—mixed-motive 
environmental law, this category might be called.27  Closely related to the 
role of environmental protection in an environmental law is the strength of 
that protection and the degree of its departure from the status quo.  Even 
as among two statutes focused on environmental protection, 
environmental protection has a different role in a statute that calls for 
studying an environmental problem than in a statute that imposes stringent 
regulatory measures to remedy the problem. 
Subject Matter.  Although they share a common focus on the 
environment, environmental laws address different subject matters.  The 
most prominent distinction drawn is between pollution laws and natural 
resource laws.28  Indeed, because of strong differences between pollution 
laws and natural resource laws, opinions differ as to whether natural 
resources laws fall within the field of environmental law or instead 
                                                 
25 See supra note 24 (citing and summarizing my prior work examining features that 
environmental laws share in common). 
26 See, e.g., Noise Control Act § 2(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4901(b) (“The Congress declares that it 
is the policy of the United States to promote an environment for all Americans free from 
noise that jeopardizes their health or welfare.”).  
27 See, e.g., Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (“It is the policy 
of the Congress that the national forests are established and shall be administered for 
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.”). Many 
other laws significantly but unintentionally affect the physical environment—positively, 
adversely, or both.  Such laws are not part of environmental law per se, although they 
merit increased attention from environmental law scholars, teachers, and practitioners.  
See infra Part II.E.2. 
28 See, e.g., Fischman, supra note 7, at 662 (referring to pollution and natural resources as 
“the two main lines of environmental law”). 
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constitute a separate but related legal field.29  Within pollution laws, one 
can differentiate laws that govern pollution abatement from laws that 
govern pollution remediation.30  Other environmental laws, such as laws 
that address environmental processes and information31 and laws that 
restrict the sale or use of substances,32 are not easy to classify as pollution 
or natural resource.  Differences in subject matter affect how 
environmental laws function.  For example, the conceptual paradigm for 
pollution statutes is regulating externalities arising from the use of private 
property, such as the Clean Air Act’s regulation of air pollutant 
emissions.33  The conceptual paradigm for natural resources statutes, on 
the other hand, is regulating use of open access public resources, such as 
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act’s land use planning 
process.34 
Endpoints.  Environmental law encompasses laws that regulate to 
protect human health as impacted by the natural environment,35 other 
human uses of environmental resources,36 and ecological health directly.37  
                                                 
29 See, e.g., id. at 718 (noting the debate and expressing the author’s preference “to use 
the term ‘environmental law’ broadly to describe the subject encompassing both pollution 
control and resource management”). 
30 See Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 
IDAHO L. REV. 473, 487-88 (2010); see also Lincoln L. Davies, Energy Policy Today and 
Tomorrow-Toward Sustainability?, 29 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 71, 76-77 
(2009) (using slightly different terminology). Pollution abatement, such as the Clean Air 
Act and Clean Water Act, “aim to reduce, or mitigate, pollution.”  Pollution remediation 
laws such as the Comprehensive Environmental Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) “seek to clean up existing 
pollution, or to ensure its proper disposal.”  Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-
Environment Disconnect, supra, at 488. 
31 See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h; 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050. 
32 See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 136 to 136y; Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2697. 
33 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (directing EPA to issue standards of 
performance for new stationary sources of air pollution). 
34 Federal Land Policy and Management Act § 202(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (“The 
Secretary shall, with public involvement and consistent with the terms and conditions of 
this Act, develop, maintain, and, when appropriate, revise land use plans which provide 
by tracts or areas for the use of the public lands.”).  Notwithstanding the distinction that 
can be made between externalities and open-access resources, the two concepts are of 
course related and often arise in combination.  Pollution externalities, for example, 
generally operate via the medium of an open access resource such as the ambient air or a 
waterway.  See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245 
(1968).  And the congestion effects of overusing an open access resource are a form of 
externality.  See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347, 351 (1967). 
35 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (directing EPA to publish 
national primary ambient air quality standards “to protect the public health”). 
36 See, e.g., Clean Air Act §§ 169A-169B, 42 U.S.C. § 7491-7492 (establishing program 
to improve visibility in certain designated areas where “visibility is an important value”). 
37 See, e.g., ESA § 2(b) (stating Congress’s policy under the ESA “to conserve 
endangered species and threatened species”). 
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Many environmental laws regulate to protect both human and ecological 
health.38  Pollution statutes generally have tended to focus more on human 
health impacts than on ecological health, whereas natural resources 
statutes have tended to focus more on ecological health than on human 
health. 
Media.  Environmental resources are commonly classified into 
media—usually water, air, and land.39  Many environmental laws aim at 
regulating specific environmental media—for example, the Clean Water 
Act regulates water pollution, the Clean Air Act regulates air pollution, 
and the Solid Waste Disposal Act regulates contamination of soil and 
groundwater.  Other laws, such as the Toxic Substances Control Act, 
which regulates the safety of chemicals in commerce, are not media-
specific.  Differences in physical characteristics across media have 
important implications for regulating to protect that type of resources from 
pollution.40  Airsheds, for example, can be much more complicated to 
manage than watersheds.41 
Mechanisms.  Environmental laws employ a variety of regulatory 
and non-regulatory mechanisms, including environmental quality-based 
standards, emissions limits based on technology standards, tradeable 
emissions permitting, pollution charges, liability, information reporting 
                                                 
38 See, e.g., TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (authorizing EPA to regulate substances 
that “present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment”); Clean Water 
Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (establishing “the national goal that wherever 
attainable, an interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection and 
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the 
water”); RCRA § 1003(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(4) (stating an objective of “assuring 
that hazardous waste management practices are conducted in a manner which protects 
human health and the environment”); CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) 
(authorizing the Attorney General to file an action in federal district court in the case of 
“an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the 
environment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a 
facility”). 
39 See, e.g., Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrated Environmental Control: The Expanding 
Matrix, 22 ENVTL. L. 77, 83 (1992); Nigel D. Key & Jonathan D. Kaplan, Multiple 
Environmental Externalities and Manure Management Policy, 32 J. AGRIC. & RES. ECON. 
115, 115 (2007); Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law and the Supreme Court: Three 
Years Later, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 653, 662 (2002).  
40 Cf. LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 71-72 (explaining that the Clean Air Act and Clean 
Water Act were each “reflective of the distinct physical features of the [type of pollution] 
it addressed”). 
41 Rich Poirot et al., Air Trajectory Pollution Climatology for the Lake Champlain Basin, 
in LAKE CHAMPLAIN IN TRANSITION: FROM RESEARCH TOWARD RESTORATION 25, 25-26 
(T.O. Manley & P.L. Manley, eds., 1999) (noting that the Lake Champlain watershed is 
“clearly defined by fixed geographical boundaries,” whereas “the spatial and temporal 
variations of emission sources and meteorological conditions, make it virtually 
impossible to develop a fixed definition of airshed”).  Even where environmental laws 
attempt to regulate specifically to particular media, environmental media cannot be fully 
segregated.  Contaminants in air pollution, for example, can pollute water or land through 
atmospheric deposition.  See Gary M. Lovett, Atmospheric Deposition of Nutrients and 
Pollutants in North America: An Ecological Perspective, 4 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 
629 (1994). 
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and disclosure requirements, use limitations, subsidies, and technical 
assistance.42  Many environmental statutes include a combination of 
multiple mechanisms, and major environmental statutes may include 
virtually all of them in some form.43 
Regulatory Targets.  Some environmental laws regulate the private 
sector directly,44 and some regulate government action qua sovereign.45  
Many statutes involve a mix of governmental and private sector regulatory 
targets.  Most of the major environmental statutes regulate federal 
facilities as well as privately owned and operated pollution sources.46  
Statutes that ultimately aim at regulating private sector conduct may 
include detailed requirements for the government agencies that implement 
them.47  Statutes that regulate government action qua sovereign indirectly 
regulate the private sector—for example, if NEPA requires the Army 
Corps of Engineers to prepare an Environmental Assessment before 
granting a permit allowing a private developer to fill a wetland,48 then the 
developer feels the regulatory effects of NEPA as much as, if not more 
than, the Corps of Engineers does. 
Form.  Environmental laws take a variety of forms, including 
treaties,49 statutes,50 administrative regulations,51 court decisions,52 and 
common law doctrines.53  Although environmental laws are generally 
                                                 
42 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-ENV-634, 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS: A USER’S GUIDE 81-142 (1995).   
43 See Andrews, supra note 8, at 231 (noting the different regulatory mechanisms 
Congress enacted in the new federal environmental statutes of the 1970s) 
44 Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (prohibiting, with certain specified 
exceptions, “the discharge of any pollutant by any person”). 
45 See, e.g., NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (directing federal agencies to prepare 
environmental impact statements for proposed major federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the environment). 
46 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (providing that federal 
facilities “shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local 
requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control 
and abatement of water pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any 
nongovernmental entity”); Clean Air Act § 118(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (providing that 
federal facilities “shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and 
local requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the 
control and abatement of air pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any 
nongovernmental entity”). 
47 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (requiring a state 
seeking EPA approval of its state implementation plans to provide assurances that it “will 
have adequate personnel, funding, and authority . . . to carry out such implementation 
plan”). 
48 See, e.g., Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1274 (10th Cir. 2004). 
49 See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 
1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3. 
50 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387. 
51 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 
52 See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007); Rapanos v. United 
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
53 See, e.g., Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(asserting claims under the federal common law of public nuisance against federal and 
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easily classified by form,54 the different forms are also highly interrelated.  
Statutes may implement treaties.55  Administrative regulations implement 
statutes.56  Courts’ interpretations of statutes become functionally part of 
the statutes themselves.57  Statutes may incorporate common law 
doctrines.58 
Implementing Institution.  Environmental laws are implemented by 
different institutions.  Some environmental laws, such as common law 
environmental torts, are primarily implemented by private parties and 
courts through litigation.  Most environmental laws, however, are 
implemented by an administrative agency of some form.  Within this 
category, there is substantial diversity.  It matters to the functioning of a 
law whether its implementation is controlled by, for example, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the purpose of which is to effect 
environmental protection59; a resource agency such as the Army Corps of 
Engineers or Forest Service, which has more diverse goals and 
traditionally has been oriented toward economic exploitation of natural 
resources; or an agency such as the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, which has not traditionally focused on environmental 
issues.60 
Level of Government.  Environmental laws originate at all different 
levels of government—for example, international,61 national, state,62 and 
                                                                                                                         
city agencies for allegedly managing the Chicago Area Waterway System in a manner 
that will allow invasive carp to move into the Great Lakes, causing an ecological 
disaster).  
54 But see, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 643 F.3d 311, 320-21 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(holding that EPA guidance document was actually a legislative rule that required notice 
and comment). 
55 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671Q (implementing the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer). 
56 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1517.7 (implementing the National Environmental 
Policy Act). 
57 See, e.g., Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 
2381955, at *5 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (interpreting the language of Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)). 
58 See, e.g., In re Bell Petro. Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
Congress intended courts to draw on “traditional and evolving common law principles” to 
determine the scope of liability under CERCLA). 
59 EPA, Our Mission and What We Do, http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/whatwedo.html 
(“The mission of EPA is to protect human health and the environment.”). 
60 The extent to which an agency has an environmental mission and environmental 
expertise can change significantly.  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service exemplify agencies that over time have been 
delegated more environmental responsibilities and have in turn responded by increasing 
their environmental expertise. 
61 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3; Agreement to Cooperate in the Solution of 
Environmental Problems in the Border Area, U.S.-Mexico, Aug. 14, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 
1025. 
62 Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (HSCA), 35 P.S. §§ 6020.101-.1305. 
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local.63  The level of government plays a very important role in defining 
the context in which lawmaking and implementation occurs.  Different 
levels of government operate under very different overarching structures 
and authorities.  For example, state governments may be able to regulate 
water pollution more broadly under their state constitutions than the 
federal government’s restricted authority under the Commerce Clause of 
the national Constitution.64  On the other hand, national environmental 
laws sometimes implement international treaties,65 state environmental 
statutes are often modeled on federal environmental statutes,66 and federal 
environmental statutes often employ cooperative federalism that allows 
state environmental programs to implement federal statutes,67 somewhat 
undercutting the distinction between the different levels.68 
Breadth.  Environmental laws vary in scope from narrowly 
targeted69 to extremely expansive.70  The breadth of an environmental law 
depends largely on its other characteristics, such as the subject matter and 
level of government.  Breadth affects, in turn, the magnitude of the costs 
and benefits of a law and the resources needed to implement it. 
B. Categories of Prominence 
Having identified features that differentiate among environmental 
laws, we can move to the task of pinpointing those environmental laws 
                                                 
63 See, e.g., Noise Control Ordinance, Los Angeles, Cal. Code §§ 12.08.010-.680. 
64 Compare 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (defining “waters of the United States” covered by the 
Clean Water Act to include interstate waters and waters with a connection to interstate 
commerce) with 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 691.1 (defining “Waters of the Commonwealth” 
covered by the Clean Streams Law “to include any and all . . . bodies or channels of 
conveyance of surface and underground water, or parts thereof, whether natural or 
artificial, within or on the boundaries of this Commonwealth”). 
65 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671Q (implementing the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer).  
66 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, §§ 6301-6309 (adopting hazardous waste management 
provisions similar to RCRA). 
67 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (allowing EPA to authorize 
state water pollution discharge permit programs implementing the federal Clean Water 
Act). 
68 Robert Fischman undertook a somewhat similar analysis in a 2008 article in which he 
identified certain attributes that distinguish among environmental laws.  See Fischman, 
supra note 7.  Fischman distinguished pollution control versus resource management 
subject matters; categorical versus utilitarian regulatory approaches, statutory detail 
versus agency latitude; Commerce Clause versus Property Clause constitutional 
authority.  Id. at 666-84.  As opposed to mapping the field generally, Fischman focused 
on how these features “distinguish the two main lines of environmental law [pollution 
law and natural resources law] from each other.”  Id. at 662. 
69 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 262m-4 (supporting “the strengthening of educational programs 
within each multilateral development bank to improve the capacity of mid-level 
managers to initiate and manage environmental aspects of development activities, and to 
train officials of borrowing countries in the conduct of environmental analyses”). 
70 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (“Except as in compliance with this section and sections 
1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by 
any person shall be unlawful”). 
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that comprise the environmental law canon and comparing them to other 
environmental laws in terms of the differentiating features. 
1. Environmental Law Canon 
This section defines the environmental law canon, identifies those 
environmental laws that comprise the canon, and then assesses the canon 
in terms of the differentiating features discussed in Part I.A, demonstrating 
a strong commonality of certain characteristics across the canon that is not 
shared by the field of environmental law as a whole. 
Attempting to define which environmental laws comprise the 
canon necessitates first defining what we mean by the canon.  “What is 
‘canonical’ in law varies according to how the canon is defined, and how 
the canon is defined depends on the purpose of the canon.”71  In general, 
canon connotes a prominence and significance of certain items among a 
broader set.  Beyond this commonality, canon has several related but 
different meanings in contemporary common usage.72  This paper uses 
canon in the sense of a collection of the most important items in a field. 
Important laws are not necessarily good laws, and so canon as used 
here is primarily descriptive rather than normative.73  Although there may 
be various ways of assessing the prominence and importance of laws to 
their legal field, which could in some cases lead to uncertainty and 
disagreement about which laws constitute a canon, the most obvious 
measures of prominence in environmental law all point to a group of six 
                                                 
71 J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 963, 975 (1998). 
72 Cf. id., at 968 n.24 (tracing the etymology and historical usage of the term). Different 
specific meanings involve different measures of significance or different types of items 
being sorted.  Canon can mean a collection of the most important items in a field. See 
David Fontana, A Case for the Twenty-First Century Constitutional Canon: 
Schneiderman v. United States, 35 CONN. L. REV. 35, 90 n.10 (2002) (citing BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 198 (7th ed. 1999)); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 825, 825 (2004). Canon can refer to a fundamental legal principle. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see, e.g., Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, 
Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1390 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000). A canon can be an important 
theme or way of thinking about a field. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family 
Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 825 (2004); Mark Tushnet, The Canon(s) of Constitutional 
Law: An Introduction, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 187 (2000). Canon can mean “an authority 
that can be invoked in the face of almost any counterevidence because it is its own 
evidence and stronger in its force than any other”—that is, an authority that “stops 
inquiry.” Stanley Fish, Not of an Age, but for All Time: Canons and Postmodernism, 43 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 11, 12 (1993). Finally, canon law refers to a body of law developed within 
a particular religious tradition. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see also, 
e.g., George La Piana, Book Review, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 855 (1936) (reviewing AMLETO 
GIOVANNI CICOGNANI, CANON LAW (1934)). 
73 That being said, a highly beneficial law is hopefully more likely to thrive and take on 
importance than a poorly functioning law, so there probably is some correlation between 
the normative value of a law and whether it is prominent and therefore canonical.  Cf. 
infra note 282 (noting that even identifying certain characteristics as salient makes an 
indirectly normative evaluation). 
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federal environmental statutes that dominates the teaching and practice of 
what is generally regarded as environmental law: 
 Clean Air Act,74 the primary federal air pollution statute; 
 Clean Water Act,75 the primary federal water pollution statute; 
 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA),76 which authorizes the cleanup of 
environmental contamination and imposes liability for such 
cleanups; 
 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),77 which 
regulates the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and 
disposal of hazardous waste; 
 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),78 which requires 
federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impacts of their 
proposed actions; and  
 Endangered Species Act (ESA),79 which regulates activities that 
harm threatened or endangered species. 
As Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate, these six statutes are far more 
likely than other environmental laws to be mentioned in cases, law review 
articles, and casebooks: 
 




                                                 
74 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q. 
75  33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387. 
76 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. 
77 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k. 
78 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h. 
79 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1599. 
80 Figure 2 indicates the number of state and federal cases decided since January 1, 2000, 
that mention each statute.  Searches were run in the Westlaw and Lexis Nexis databases 
of all state and federal cases; the numbers reported are the average of the two databases.  
“NFMA” refers to the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614.  
“FLPMA” refers to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1787.  “FIFRA” refers to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 
U.S.C. §§ 136 to 136y.  “OPA” refers to the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762.  
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These data show that when lawyers, scholars, and teachers 
practice, think, and teach about the field of environmental law, they do so 
                                                 
81 Figure 3 indicates the number of law review articles published since January 1, 2000, 
that mention each statute.  Searches were run in the Westlaw and Lexis Nexis databases 
of all U.S. and Canadian law journals; the numbers reported are the average of the two 
databases.  “SDWA” refers to the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-
26.  “Kyoto” refers to the Kyoto Protocol.  “GATT” refers to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. 
82 Figure 4 indicates the frequency with which federal environmental statutes are 
substantially covered in eleven leading environmental law casebooks.  See ROBIN 
KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT (3d ed. 2012); HOLLY DOREMUS ET 
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW:  PROBLEMS, CASES, AND READINGS (6th ed. 2012); 
DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (8th ed. 
2010); ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:  LAW AND POLICY 
(4th ed. 2003); CRAIG N. JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
(3d ed. 2010); LINDA A. MALONE & WILLIAM M. TABB, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY, 
AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2011); PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1994); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:  LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY (6th ed. 2009); ZYGMUNT 
J.B. PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY:  NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY  (4th ed. 
2010); RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 2012). 
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primarily with reference to a relatively small set of common materials.  
Unlike other legal fields in which there may be a divergence among what 
materials are taught in law school courses, the materials requisite for 
knowledgeable participation in civic debate, and the materials important to 
legal academics,83 in the field of environmental law a common set of 
materials predominates in all three of these forums.  These statutes 
comprise the environmental law canon. 
Comparing the six statutes in the environmental law canon to the 
various characteristics that differentiate among environmental laws,84 the 
environmental law canon generally shares five characteristics in 
common—the role of environmental protection, the subject matter, the 
form of law, the level of government, and the institution charged with 
implementation: 
 Laws in the environmental law canon are enacted primarily for the 
purpose of protecting the environment. 
 Canonical environmental laws generally—but not universally—
address pollution. 
 Canonical environmental laws are statutes, including the progeny 
of statutes such as administrative regulations implementing a 
statute or cases interpreting a statute or regulation. 
 Laws in the environmental law canon are national laws. 
 EPA administers most laws in the environmental law canon. 
In addition to sharing these functional attributes, the environmental 
law canon also shares a common historical pedigree.  The statutes that 
comprise the environmental law canon are the product of the 
“Environmental Revolution”85 of the 1970s, which encompassed the first 
Earth Day,86 enactment of most of the major federal environmental 
statutes,87 and the creation of the EPA.88  That being said, only some of 
                                                 
83 Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson refer to these respectively as the “pedagogical 
canon,” “cultural literacy canon,” and the “academic theory canon.”  J.M. Balkin & 
Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998). 
84 See supra Part I.A. 
85 See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 
RUTGERS L.J. 395, 396 (1995); Denis Hayes, Environmental Law and Millennial Politics, 
25 ENVTL. L. 953, 964 (1995); Wallace E. Oates, On Environmental Federalism, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 1321, 1328 (1997); see also Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Participation in 
the Era of Reinvention: The Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 
717 (1999) (referring to the “environmental law revolution”); Fischman, supra note 7, at 
720 (same); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the 
Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. 
REV. 1407, 1459 (1996) (same). 
86 See Anderson, supra note 85, at 395 (describing events during the first Earth Day on 
April 22, 1970). 
87 See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852; Clean 
Water Act, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970); Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 
Stat. 1676 (1970); Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973); see 
also LAZARUS, supra note 9, at at 70 (listing eighteen major federal environmental 
protection statutes enacted during the 1970s). 
88 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970). 
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the federal environmental statutes Congress enacted during the 1970s are 
canonical; others receive relatively meager attention in cases, casebooks, 
and law review articles.89 
The environmental law canon, as the concept is employed here, is 
defined and functions largely descriptively.  But the canon has normative 
elements as well.  Within the environmental community it is largely 
revered, even when criticized.90  Calls for political action on 
environmental issues often explicitly invoke the 1970s as a model and 
inspiration,91 recognizing both the dramatic material accomplishments of 
the enactments of that period and their strong idealism which resonates 
with many environmentalists. William Eskridge and John Ferejohn have 
classified the statutes of the environmental law canon as examples of 
“superstatutes,”92 which share three features: 
                                                 
89 See, e.g., Noise Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (1972) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918).  As compared with thousands of citations in cases and law 
reviews to the canonical environmental statutes, see supra Figures 2-3, just 38 cases and 
92 law review articles since 2000 have mentioned the Noise Control Act.  
Some environmental histories have criticized, to greater and lesser extents, the 
narrative of the Environmental Revolution—that is, the idea that the early 1970s 
represented the spontaneous “divine conception” of a new field of law. See, e.g., KARL 
BOYD BROOKS, BEFORE EARTH DAY:  THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW, 1945-1970, at 14 (2009).  These histories have described the 1970s as a phase in 
the continued development of a body of law that long preceded the developments in the 
1970s. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra, at 14.  Richard Lazarus has offered a more middle-
ground perspective, emphasizing both the dramatic changes in the early 1970s and the 
historical antecedents to those changes.  See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 49 (“The 
environmental statutes and institutions that emerged in the 1970s were of a very different 
magnitude than any previously existing regimes for environmental protection, but they 
reflected a logical, albeit exponential, outgrowth of decades of legal evolution on closely 
related matters.”).  Regardless, all of these histories readily acknowledge the significance 
of the 1970s to the construction of our current system of federal environmental statutes. 
See, e.g., BROOKS, supra, at 15 (noting that “[t]he rate of environmental lawmaking 
attained its zenith in the early 1970s”); Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-
Environment Disconnect, supra note 30, at 486 (“No matter how environmental law’s 
historical taxonomy is built, it is plain that the 1970s were ground-shifting.”); LAZARUS, 
supra note 9, at 69 (characterizing the 1970s as “a statutory and institutional 
transformation” during which “[s]eemingly every aspect of environmental protection and 
natural resource conservation was the subject of comprehensive congressional 
legislation”). 
90 See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 253 (opining that, despite “slippage,” “regulatory 
perversities,” and “serious and persistent socioeconomic and racial inequities,” 
“environmental law has been remarkably successful”). 
91 See, e.g., David K. Hausman, Sen. Kerry Urges Eco-Awareness in Speech, HARVARD 
CRIMSON, Apr. 23, 2007 (reporting speech in which Senator John Kerry “urged a return 
to the environmental activism of the early 1970s”). 
92 WILLIAM N ESKRIDGE, JR., & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 256, 301 
(2010) (offering the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Endangered Species Act as 
examples of “superstatutes” that comprise a “green constitution”); William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L.J. 1215, 1242-46 (2001) (discussing the 
Endangered Species Act as a “superstatute” case study); see also Jim Chen, Legal 
Mythmaking in A Time of Mass Extinctions: Reconciling Stories of Origins with Human 
Destiny, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 292 (2005) (“The National Environmental Policy 
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[S]uperstatutes . . . (1) embod[y] a new principle or policy 
displacing common law baselines, responsive to important 
social or economic challenges facing the country; (2) [are] 
drafted and enacted after a process of institutionalized 
deliberation responsive to the needs of We the People; and 
(3) [are] stuck in the public culture, after a period of 
implementation and formal confirmation by Congress after 
public discussion.”93 
Superstatutes, although “subordinate to the Constitution,” become part of 
“the fundamental structure and values of American public policy,” 
“instatiat[ing] both social norms and legal rules.”94  Thus, according to 
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s account of superstatutes, the environmental law 
canon becomes the focal point not only of environmental law, but of 
environmental norms more generally. 
This points to a more subtle, and potentially pernicious, normative 
effect of the environmental law canon.  The predominance of the 
environmental law canon in the field, and the strongly similar features the 
canon exhibits, project an image of environmental law that is more 
homogenous and narrow than the field as a whole.  This, in turn, obscures 
the existence of environmental laws outside of the canon, and more 
importantly obscures the possibility of enacting environmental laws that 
do not resemble the canon.95 
2. Special Cases:  ESA and NEPA 
Two canonical environmental statutes, the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA)96 and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),97 present special 
                                                                                                                         
Act of 1970 (“NEPA”) and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”) head the list of 
environmental “ ‘super-statutes’ ” whose “ ‘institutional [and] normative” impact reaches 
issues ordinarily addressed through Constitutional law.’ ”) (internal footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra, at 1216). 
93 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 92, at 26. 
94 Id. at 27, 27, 28. 
95 An exception to this is the federalism debate over the optimal balance between national 
and state environmental regulation, which has received ample attention.  See, e.g., 
Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. 
ENV'TL L.J. 130, 151 (2005); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and 
the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 
14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23 (1996);  Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-
Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); 
Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); 
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 
(1992); Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, “Facts Are Stubborn Things”: An 
Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State 
Environmental Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 55 (1998); Peter P. 
Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in 
Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 67 
(1996). 
96 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1599. 
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cases.  By any measure of prominence, the ESA and NEPA qualify as 
canonical.  Commentators often describe the ESA and NEPA as among 
the most important environmental laws.98  Both the ESA and NEPA are 
among the most litigated environmental statutes, the most cited in law 
review articles, and appear in the leading environmental law casebooks.99  
Both focus overwhelmingly on environmental protection.100  Both were 
enacted in the 1970s.101 
But the ESA and NEPA do not entirely follow the dominant 
pattern for the environmental law canon, and have some characteristics 
more associated with environmental laws outside the canon.  Both statutes 
are often classified as resource statutes,102 and receive extensive coverage 
                                                                                                                         
97  42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h. 
98  The ESA has been called “one of the most potent environmental laws,” J.B. Ruhl & 
James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the 
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 59 (2010); and 
“one of America's best-known and most important environmental laws,” Reed D. 
Benson, Dams, Duties, and Discretion: Bureau of Reclamation Water Project Operations 
and the Endangered Species Act, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9 (2008).  NEPA is often 
called the “Magna Carta” of environmental law.  See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Judging 
Environmental Law, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 209 (2004); Daniel R. Mandelker, The 
National Environmental Policy Act: A Review of Its Experience and Problems, 32 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 293, 293 (2010). 
99 See infra Part I.B (reporting the frequency that specific environmental statutes appear 
in cases, law review articles, and environmental law casebooks). 
100 ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (“The purposes of this chapter are to provide a 
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species 
depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered 
species and threatened species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve 
the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this section.”); 
NEPA § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (“The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national 
policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his 
environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the 
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the 
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; 
and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.”). 
101 Congress enacted NEPA in 1970, see Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (1970), and the 
ESA in 1973, see Pub. L. No. 93-205, 81 Stat. 884 (1973). 
102 See, e.g., Fischman, supra note 7, at 669, 682 (referring to NEPA and the ESA, 
respectively, as resource statutes); Alyson C. Flournoy et. al., Harnessing the Power of 
Information to Protect Our Public Natural Resource Legacy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1575, 
1591-92 (2008) (referring to NEPA as a resource statute); Alyson C. Flournoy, 
Preserving Dynamic Systems: Wetlands, Ecology and Law, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 
105, 132 (1996 (referring to the ESA as a resource statute); Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, 
Birds and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 MISS. L.J. 403, 
464 (1994) (referring to NEPA as a resource statute).  Although NEPA and the ESA are 
often classified as resource statutes, they have distinctive features—e.g., primary focus 
on environmental protection, broad application across the federal government—that 
differentiate them from the other resource statutes and explain their prominence and 
inclusion in the canon. 
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in natural resources law casebooks.103  Neither statute focuses on 
pollution, and neither is primarily administered by EPA.  The ESA is 
primarily administered by resource agencies—the Fish and Wildlife 
Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Fisheries 
Service104—but also places significant implementation responsibilities on 
all federal agencies.105  NEPA’s obligations attach to “all agencies of the 
Federal Government.”106   
Moreover, the nature of NEPA’s and the ESA’s requirements are 
such that implementation of those statutes becomes integrated with other, 
non-environmental law.  NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare and to 
release to the public an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before 
taking any major action “significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.”107  This obligation attaches to agency programs as diverse 
as the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s funding of a 
housing development revitalization project,108 the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s designation of a national interest electric 
transmission corridor,109 and the Army Corps of Engineers’ construction 
of a dam.110  The Endangered Species Act prohibits the “take” of any 
endangered species111 and further requires all federal agencies, in 
consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service or the Fisheries Service, 
“insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency 
. . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered 
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse 
modification of [critical] habitat of such species.”112  These requirements, 
like NEPA, also apply to diverse circumstances, such as the Federal 
                                                 
103 See, e.g., CHRISTINE KLEIN, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW:  A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF 
PROBLEMS AND CASES 123-84, 759-823 (2005); JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL 
RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 258-92, 348-440 (2d ed. 2009). 
104 See, e.g., ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (delegating authority to list species as 
endangered or threatened to the Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of Commerce). 
105 See, e.g., ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring “[e]ach Federal agency” to 
insure that its actions are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any 
endangered species or threatened species”). 
106 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 
107 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). Not every federal action necessitates a full EIS. To 
determine whether the environmental impacts of a proposed action will be significant 
enough to warrant a full EIS, the agency may prepare an Environmental Assessment. See 
40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(b)-(c), 1508.9 (2011). If, based on the Environmental Assessment, 
the agency concludes that the proposed action will not significantly impact the 
environment, it will issue a Finding of No Significant Impact in lieu of an EIS. See 40 
C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2011). See generally Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 
756–58 (2004) (providing an overview of EISs, Environmental Assessments, and 
Findings of No Significant Impact). 
108 Coliseum Square Ass’n v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 237–38 (5th Cir. 2006) 
109 California Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1096-98 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
110 See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 364-67 (1989) 
111 Endangered Species Act § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1)(B). 
112 Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
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Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) provision of federal flood 
insurance,113 the Army’s ongoing operation of a military base,114 and the 
Department of Energy's grant of an easement across its property for 
construction and use of a private mining road.115   
Because NEPA and the ESA are for the most part implemented by 
agencies that do not specialize in environmental law, and because NEPA 
and the ESA’s requirements apply to activities not necessarily undertaken 
as part of environmental programs, both statutes are essentially 
incorporated into non-environmental programs.  For example, the 
application of the ESA’s “take” and “jeopardy” provisions to FEMA’s 
National Flood Insurance Program essentially incorporates the ESA 
provisions into the federal flood insurance program.  The integration of 
NEPA and ESA implementation with non-environmental programs 
distinguishes NEPA and the ESA from other statutes in the environmental 
canon, which are administered by EPA as part of its set of environmental 
statutes.  In fact, the integration of NEPA and ESA implementation with 
non-environmental programs resembles a key feature of some non-
canonical environmental statutes—a category I call “embedded 
environmental laws”—which Part II examines in detail. 
As statutes that receive widespread attention from practitioners and 
academics, but which have some distinctive features more associated with 
environmental laws outside of the canon than within it, the ESA and 
NEPA somewhat muddy the distinction between canonical and 
noncanonical environmental law.  But the ESA’s and NEPA’s unusual, 
noncanonical features also make them potentially useful vehicles for 
understanding how the distinctive features of noncanonical environmental 
law affect how it functions as law.116  Moreover, the noncanonical 
characteristics of NEPA and the ESA enable both statutes to work 
synergistically in support of noncanonical environmental provisions.117 
3. Subcanonical Environmental Law 
Outside of the core environmental law canon lie other sets of 
environmental laws that have some, but not all, of the features of 
canonical environmental law and a correspondingly diminished 
prominence in the field—well below the importance of the statutes in the 
canon, but still more important than other categories of noncanonical 
environmental law.  Some of these subcanonical environmental laws have 
important links with canonical environmental laws. 
                                                 
113 See Florida Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 1141-44 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that the ESA § 7 applies to the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s administration 
of the National Flood Insurance Program). 
114 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143 (D. Ariz. 2002). 
115 Sierra Club v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D. Colo. 2002). 
116 See infra Part II. 
117 See infra notes 223-224 and accompanying text. 
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Resource Statutes.  Outside of the canon of federal statutes enacted 
primarily to protect the natural environment, the set of laws most closely 
associated with environmental law are the federal natural resource statutes.  
They receive significant attention in case law, in law school curricula, and 
in legal scholarship—although to a lesser extent than the pollution statutes 
and with a disproportionate emphasis in the West.118  Resource statutes 
share several characteristics that distinguish them from statutes in the 
environmental law canon.  Resource statutes are mixed-motive 
environmental laws that, although they include a goal of conserving and 
preserving elements of the natural environment,119 also intentionally 
facilitate the exploitation of natural resources.120  Their subject matter is 
natural resources rather than pollution, and they are administered by 
resource agencies rather than by EPA.121  Resource agencies are staffed 
and operate very differently than EPA, and even operate under different 
constitutional authority.122 
Other Federal Pollution Statutes.  Not all federal pollution statutes 
fall within the environmental law canon.  EPA administers other statutes 
lacking the prominence of the major pollution statutes that comprise the 
environmental law canon.  Some of these EPA statutes, such as the Safe 
                                                 
118 In fact, the importance of publicly owned natural resources in rural areas of the West 
may give the resource statutes more prominence than the canonical pollution statutes in 
such areas. 
119 See, e.g., Federal Lands Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) § 202(c)(3), 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1712(c)(3) (instructing the Secretary of the Interior, in the management of public lands 
administered by the Bureau of Land Management, to “give priority to the designation and 
protection of areas of critical environmental concern”).  Clean Water Act § 404, 33 
U.S.C. § 1344, which regulates the placement of dredge and fill material in waters of the 
United States, presents an interesting question of classification.  Although the Clean 
Water Act overall is a canonical pollution statute, the dredge-and-fill program under 
§ 404 is often viewed instead as a wetlands protection provision more associated with 
natural resources law.  See, e.g., JEFFREY M. GABA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 88 (4th ed. 
2009) (observing that § 404 “is typically not addressed in detail in environmental law 
casebooks”); Oliver A. Houck, Retaking the Exam: How Environmental Law Failed New 
Orleans and the Gulf Coast South and How It Might Yet Succeed, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1059, 
1070 (2007) (“Originally seen as a pollution control program, section 404 quickly 
became a wetlands-development control program as well . . . .”). 
120 See, e.g., FLPMA § 202(c)(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(1) (instructing the Secretary of the 
Interior, in the management of the same public lands, to “observe the principles of 
multiple use and sustained yield,” which are defined to include the potential extraction of 
timber and minerals); see also LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 178 (“Natural resources laws 
historically equated the public interest with the economic exploitation and development 
of natural resources, although resource conservation and ‘public trust doctrine’ principles 
had emerged as a significant counterweight by the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.”). 
121 See, e.g., National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 
(administered by the Forest Service); National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1 
to 18f-3 (administered by the National Park Service); Federal Lands Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1787 (administered by the Bureau of 
Land Management). 
122 EPA statutes operate largely under the authority of the Commerce Clause; natural 
resource statutes operate largely under the authority of the Property Clause. 
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Drinking Water Act,123 have the requisite features of the statutes in the 
canon but are much smaller programs by virtue of their narrower scope.  
Others aim at somewhat different objectives.  The Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA)124 and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),125 for example, address human health and 
environmental hazards throughout the life cycle of a substance rather than 
just when a substance is released into the environment.  The Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA or EPCRTKA)126 
addresses emergency planning and reporting of inventories and releases of 
hazardous chemicals. 
State Law Analogues.  Although the environmental law canon is 
decidedly federal—for example, no major environmental law casebook 
examines state environmental laws in detail—some state environmental 
statutes are functionally close to the canon.  State environmental statutes 
are often modeled on federal environmental statutes.127  Many times this 
modeling arises because federal environmental statutes, through what is 
known as cooperative federalism or “delegated program federalism,”128 
allow state environmental programs to implement federal statutes.129  To 
some extent, this relationship emphasizes and inflates the primacy of 
federal environmental law, because state environmental laws developed 
under cooperative federalism usually closely resemble the federal 
environmental laws they implement.  But the role of states in cooperative 
federalism regimes also gives states a degree of power in setting federal 
policy, because EPA sometimes lacks the capacity to supersede state 
programs and accordingly must defer to state programs even when they 
diverge from the supposedly minimum federal standard.130  Even state 
statutes modeled on federal statutes may give states increased authority 
that federal agencies lack under their statutes.  Washington’s cleanup 
statute, for example, includes petroleum and petroleum products that 
                                                 
123 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26. 
124 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2697. 
125 7 U.S.C. §§136-136y. 
126 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 
127 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, §§ 6301-6309 (adopting hazardous waste management 
provisions similar to RCRA); 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-13.7 (adopting water pollution 
provisions similar to the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act). 
128 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1565 (2007) (noting that federal 
environmental statutes often allow state governments to assume implementation and 
enforcement of a program if state laws are at least as stringent federal requirements); 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 
1256, 1276 (2009) (“Since the 1970s, states have implemented and enforced most of the 
United States's major environmental statutes.”).  
129 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (allowing EPA to authorize 
state water pollution discharge permit programs implementing the federal Clean Water 
Act). 
130 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 128, at 1276-77 (citing John P. Dwyer, The 
Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995)). 
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CERCLA specifically excludes.131  Pennsylvania’s Clean Streams Law 
similarly covers more water bodies than the federal Clean Water Act.132 
Common Law.  The common law also occupies a special place in 
environmental law, in some ways like certain state environmental laws—
outside the canon but also closely intertwined with it.  Common law 
doctrines that address environmental problems share few features in 
common with canonical environmental laws.  Common law has a 
primarily remedial purpose, whereas environmental regulation has a 
regulatory purpose.133  Common law doctrines employ different regulatory 
mechanisms than statutes; common law imposes liability for the harm 
conduct causes, statutes generally prohibit certain conduct, without a 
showing of individualized harm.  Common law doctrines are judge-made 
and administered by courts through largely private litigation; statutes are 
enacted by legislatures and administered by administrative agencies.  
Common law doctrines are primarily state, rather than federal law.  The 
differences between environmental statutes and common law are in part 
quite deliberate.  Modern environmental statutes were enacted in part 
because of the perceived inadequacy of common law doctrines to protect 
the environment.134  But common law doctrines are also not entirely 
separate from environmental statutes—for example, courts often construe 
undefined statutory terms according to their meaning in the common 
law,135 and statutory requirements may help to define common law 
liability.136 
International Environmental Treaties.  International environmental 
treaties lie at the intersection of the fields of environmental law and 
international law and form the foundation of international environmental 
law, a subfield of both fields.  Some treaties have generated implementing 
legislation that shows up in the environmental law canon, such as the 
provisions of the Clean Air Act that implement the Montreal Protocol.137 
                                                 
131 Compare CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (stating that hazardous substance 
“does not include petroleum”) with Wash. Rev. Code § 70.105D.020(10)(D) (defining 
hazardous substance to include “Petroleum or petroleum products”). 
132 Compare 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (tying the definition of “waters of the United States” 
covered by the Clean Water Act to the waters’ effect on foreign and interstate commerce) 
with 5 Pa. Stat. § 691.1 (defining “Waters of the Commonwealth” covered by the Clean 
Streams Law “to include any and all . . . bodies or channels of conveyance of surface and 
underground water, or parts thereof, whether natural or artificial, within or on the 
boundaries of this Commonwealth”). 
133 PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 82, at 74. 
134 See Percival, supra note 7, at 159 (noting that the major environmental statutes 
enacted in the 1970s were in part “adopted in response to perceived inadequacies of the 
common law”). 
135 See, e.g., United States v. Fountain, 277 F.3d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 2001) (construing the 
Lacey Act by inquiring “whether Congress used terms which have a specific common-
law meaning”). 
136 See, e.g., Gearhardt v. Am. Reinforced Paper Co., 244 F.2d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 1957) 
(affirming judgment for plaintiff where defendant negligently caused a fire that damaged 
plaintiff’s property in violation of Illinois state law). 
137 See Clean Air Act §§ 601-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671q. 
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4. Noncanonical Environmental Law 
Outside of the categories of canonical and subcanonical 
environmental laws, there are other environmental laws that lie clearly 
apart from the canon of the field, both in terms of their relative obscurity 
within environmental law and differences in their characteristic features.   
Some of these categories of noncanonical environmental law 
exhibit multiple features that separate them from the environmental law 
canon.  For example, state natural resources statutes,138 which tend to 
receive meager attention, are natural resource statutes rather than pollution 
statutes and state rather than federal laws.  Noncanonical environmental 
law also includes private law that addresses environmental concerns, such 
as a lease term that seeks to prevent the lessee from causing environmental 
contamination on the lessor’s property.139 
Other categories of noncanonical environmental law, such as local 
land use law, are recognized independent legal fields.  These related fields 
overlap incompletely with environmental law, in that some but not all of 
the laws within the field address environmental concerns.  Such related 
fields have their own independent casebooks, scholarship, and doctrine.140  
Energy law provides an interesting example of a related field that may 
once have fit within the category of noncanonical environmental law, or 
perhaps not environmental law at all, but has arguably ascended to at least 
the category of subcanonical environmental law by virtue of energy law’s 
increasing focus on environmental concerns and the increased appreciation 
of its important relationship to environmental issues such as air pollution 
and climate change. 
Apart from related legal fields, other noncanonical environmental 
laws take the form of environmental provisions contained within a statute 
not primarily aimed at regulating environmental impacts, or environmental 
statutes contained within a larger non-environmental program.  I 
collectively refer to these categories as embedded environmental law, 
reflecting the incorporation of environmental provisions or statutes into 
broader non-environmental statutes or programs.141  Embedded 
                                                 
138 See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 9-13-1 to -274; Ohio Rev. Code § 1503.01-.99. 
139 See, e.g., Heather Hughes, Securitization and Suburbia, 90 OR. L. REV. 359, 411 
(2011) (contending that that “private ordering [is] central to the concerns of 
environmental law”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2033 (2005) (arguing that “second-order agreements” among 
private actors create incentives that affect the implementation of public law regulation). 
140 See, e.g., ALAN ALTSHULER & JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS (1993); DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET 
AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT (8th ed. 2011). 
141 Embedded environmental laws differ from legal fields or concepts that merely overlap 
in application with environmental law.  Bankruptcy law, for example, often applies in 
circumstances in which environmental law also applies.  See, e.g., In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 
925 (9th Cir. 1993) (addressing whether claim against business owners for costs of 
cleanup of hazardous waste at their former business property was discharged in their 
bankruptcy); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(addressing whether Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay precluded state agency from 
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environmental law—including its distinctive features and importance to 
the broader project of environmental law—is the focus of Part II. 
II. Embedded Environmental Law 
Embedded environmental laws, a subspecies of noncanonical 
environmental law, are contained within a statute or program that is not 
primarily aimed at regulating environmental impacts and usually are 
administered by an agency that does not specialize in environmental 
issues.  Essentially, embedded environmental laws are environmental laws 
organized with other, nonenvironmental laws.  Embedded environmental 
laws thus lie within overlapping legal fields—both environmental law and 
whatever field they are embedded within. 
Embedded environmental laws have heretofore been overlooked, 
both individually and collectively, as a category of functionally distinct 
environmental law.  To a certain extent their obscurity is understandable.  
Embedded environmental laws do not compare to the environmental law 
canon in terms of size or prominence; they do not belong in the canon.  
Embedded environmental laws are hidden away in the law generally, 
isolated both substantively and institutionally from other environmental 
laws.  Many of them are relatively minor provisions with uncertain 
environmental impacts or even an uncertain relationship to environmental 
concerns.  But it is a mistake to ignore embedded environmental laws, in 
part precisely because they differ so much from the environmental law 
canon, for their differences create the basis for an alternative model of 
environmental lawmaking.  Embedded environmental laws have the 
potential to play an increasing and constructive role in the future of 
environmental law. 
This Part examines embedded environmental laws as a discrete and 
largely ignored category of environmental law.  Part II.A identifies four 
different types of embedded environmental laws, adding clarity to the 
definition of the category.  Part II.B then explores how the features 
identified in Part I.C, which differentiate among environmental laws, are 
manifested in embedded environmental law.  Part II.C examines the 
implications of those features for how embedded environmental laws 
function as compared with the environmental law canon.  Finally, Part 
II.D argues that embedded environmental law is as an alternative and 
parallel system that can complement and substitute for canonical 
environmental law, helping environmental law to address some of its 
major challenges. 
                                                                                                                         
enforcing injunction against bankruptcy debtor to correct violations of various state 
environmental protection statutes).  This overlap poses interesting and important 
questions for the application of both legal fields, see, e.g., Jason S. Brookner, 
Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy: An Overview, 112 BANKING L.J. 124 (1995); 
Stanley M. Spracker & James D. Barnette, The Treatment of Environmental Matters in 
Bankruptcy Cases, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 85 (1995), but does not by itself transform 
bankruptcy laws into environmental laws. 
 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OUTSIDE THE CANON 28 
A. Types 
Because statutes are not necessarily codified by the same method 
of organization as they are enacted, environmental laws can be embedded 
at creation only, at implementation only, or at both creation and 
implementation: 
 An environmental law is embedded only at creation if it is enacted 
as part of a non-environmental statute but administered with an 
environmental statute or program.  For example, the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005,142 which overall was not an environmental law, 
including provisions amending the Clean Air Act with respect to 
regulation of renewable fuels.143 
 An environmental law is embedded only at implementation if it is 
enacted as part of an environmental statute but administered with a 
non-environmental statute or program.  For example, the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1990144 amended the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act145 to require the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration to issue “a chemical process safety standard 
designed to protect employees from hazards associated with 
accidental releases of highly hazardous chemicals in the 
workplace.”146 
 An environmental law is embedded at both creation and 
implementation if it is enacted as part of a non-environmental 
statute and codified and administered with a non-environmental 
statute or program.  For example, Section 4(f) of the Department of 
Transportation Act of 1966, which restricts the use of certain 
parklands and historic areas for federal transportation projects, was 
enacted and is codified as part of the Department of 
Transportation’s enabling statute.147 
This Part’s examination of embedded environmental laws will 
focus on those embedded at both creation and implementation, because 
those laws most thoroughly exhibit the distinctive characteristics of 
embedded environmental laws and stand in sharpest contrast with 
                                                 
142 Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). 
143 Id. § 1501, 119 Stat. at 1067-76 (amending Clean Air Act § 211, 42 U.S.C. § 7545). 
144 Pub.L. No. 101–549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). 
145 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678. 
146 Id. § 304(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655. 
147 Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931, 934 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 303); see also, e.g., Airway Improvement Act (“AAIA”), 49 U.S.C. § 47106(c)(1)(B) 
(requiring Federal Aviation Administration to take “every reasonable step” to avoid 
approving airport runway development projects that will have “a significant adverse 
effect on natural resources”); Electric Consumers Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-495, § 
3(a), 100 Stat. 1243, 1243 (1986) (amending Federal Power Act § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 
803(a), to add “the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife 
(including related spawning grounds and habitat)" to the required elements of any 
hydropower licenses approved by the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission)). 
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canonical environmental statutes.  Its observations and conclusions about 
laws embedded at both creation and implementation apply in part, 
however, to the functioning of environmental laws embedded only at 
creation (and not implementation) or only at implementation.  Such 
partially embedded environmental laws function as a hybrid of 
characteristics associated with conventional environmental laws and 
characteristics associated with fully embedded environmental laws.  For 
example, take the Energy Policy Act of 2005’s amendments to the Clean 
Air Act,148 embedded at creation but not implementation:  Enacting the 
amendments as part of an energy bill, rather than as part of a statute 
focused on the Clean Air Act, likely affected the politics of the 
legislation.149  On the other hand, once EPA incorporated the amendments 
into the agency’s ongoing Clean Air Act programs, the amendments 
essentially became part of the environmental law canon.  Depending on 
the objectives and the circumstances, hybridity may pose an advantage or 
a disadvantage. 
B. Features 
Embedded environmental laws have distinctive features in 
common that help both to define the category and to distinguish it from 
other environmental laws.  Embedded environmental laws are thus more 
than just examples of environmental laws outside of the canon; they are 
their own coherent category. 
Implementing Institution.  Whereas most statutes within the 
environmental law canon are administered by EPA, and many of the 
subcanonical resource statutes are administered by resource agencies with 
significant environmental experience and expertise, embedded 
environmental laws are often administered by agencies that are not 
primarily environmental, such as the Internal Revenue Service’s 
administration of an excise tax on ozone-depleting substances,150 the 
Department of Transportation’s administration of Section 4(f) of its 
organic act,151 or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s 
administration of § 10(a) of the Federal Power Act, requiring hydropower 
licenses to provide “adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of 
fish and wildlife.”152 
Role of Environmental Protection.  As one gets further away from 
the environmental law canon, the role of the environment in 
environmental laws tends to get less prominent and murkier.  The 
environment, to the extent it is a focus at all, lacks the claims of primacy 
                                                 
148 See supra notes 142-143. 
149 See infra Part II.C.3 (examining the political characteristics of embedded 
environmental laws). 
150 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681-4682. 
151 Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931, 934 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 303). 
152 16 U.S.C. § 803(a). 
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that it enjoys in the environmental law canon.  For example, the excise tax 
on ozone-depleting substances was enacted both to protect the 
stratospheric ozone layer and to raise revenue.153  The Plant Protection 
Act,154 which aims to control the spread of plant pests and noxious weeds, 
mentions environmental concerns among its statutory objectives but seems 
primarily oriented toward protecting the agriculture sector.155  Similarly, 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,156 among its various provisions, states 
six requirements for tribal gaming ordinances for Class II gaming under 
the statute; one of those six requirements provides that the gaming must be 
“conducted in a manner which adequately protects the environment and 
the public health and safety.”157  This isolated environmental provision is 
buried within a statute focused generally on gaming’s ability to promote 
tribal economic development and concerns about potentially corrupting 
influences such as organized crime.158  Indeed, for many embedded 
environmental laws, even the environmental-ness of the law at all is 
unclear.159 
Subject Matter and Media.  Consistent with the predominance of 
the environmental law canon, when Congress addresses an environmental 
problem involving a subject matter or media similar to existing canonical 
environmental law, Congress tends to utilize the environmental law canon, 
using existing regulatory mechanisms implemented by agencies 
specializing in environmental regulation.  Thus, for example, Congress 
addressed anthropogenic depletion of the stratospheric ozone through the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which directed EPA to regulate 
ozone-depleting substances under the Clean Air Act.160  Congress tends to 
enact embedded environmental laws, on the other hand, to address more 
novel environmental problems—for example, the invasive plant species 
regulated under the Plant Protection Act, airport noise regulated under the 
Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act,161 or marketing of organically 
produced products regulated under the Organic Foods Production Act.162 
Breadth.  Given their relative obscurity, it is not surprising that 
embedded environmental laws are smaller and narrower programs than the 
canonical environmental statutes.  One of the ways in which embedded 
environmental laws are narrow, however, has important functional 
implications:  many embedded environmental laws target a specific 
sector—for example, the Swampbuster and Sodbuster provisions of the 
Food Security Act which targets agriculture, Federal Power Act § 10(a) 
                                                 
153 See infra note 215 (describing the history of the tax). 
154 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7786. 
155 See id. § 7701 (setting forth congressional findings). 
156 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721. 
157 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(E). 
158 See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2702. 
159 See infra Part III.C. 
160 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671q. 
161 49 U.S.C. §§ 47501-47510. 
162 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6522. 
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which targets hydropower, or Section 4(f) which targets transportation.  
Sector-specific environmental laws are more readily embedded into other 
non-environmental programs because many non-environmental 
government programs are sector-specific and administered by sector-
specific institutions such as the Department of Agriculture, Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, and the Department of Transportation. 
Despite these patterns, to a significant extent a defining 
characteristic of embedded environmental laws is their diversity of 
features.  Embedded environmental laws are not constrained by the 
comparatively homogenous model of the environmental law canon.  In 
addition to addressing different types of subject matter and media, with 
different roles for environmental protection, and administered by different 
agencies than the environmental law canon, embedded environmental laws 
employ a broader variety of regulatory mechanisms, including taxes,163 
incentives,164 and planning requirements165 as well as more conventional 
regulation.166 
                                                 
163 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681-4682. 
164 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-3813. 
165 Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931, 934 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 303). 
166 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5128. As previously mentioned, see supra Part I.B.2, there are 
interesting parallels between the implementation of NEPA and the ESA and the 
implementation of embedded environmental laws.  Like the administration of embedded 
environmental laws, NEPA analyses and ESA consultations are often undertaken by 
agencies that are not environmental specialists.  See, e.g., Florida Key Deer v. Paulison, 
522 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying ESA § 7 to Federal Emergency Management 
Agency); Am. Bird Conservancy, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (applying 
NEPA to Federal Communications Commission); Soc'y Hill Towers Owners' Ass'n v. 
Rendell, 210 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying NEPA to Department of Housing and 
Urban Development).  Agencies apply NEPA and the ESA in conjunction with their 
administration of other non-environmental statutes, see, e.g., Florida Key Deer, 522 F.3d 
at 1141-44 (applying ESA § 7 to the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
implementation of the National Flood Insurance Act); Am. Bird Conservancy, 516 F.3d 
1027 (applying NEPA to Federal Communications Commission’s implementation of the 
Communications Act of 1934); Soc'y Hill Towers Owners' Ass'n, 210 F.3d 168 (applying 
NEPA to Department of Housing and Urban Development’s implementation of the 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974), just as agencies often apply 
embedded environmental laws in conjunction with their administration of broader non-
environmental programs.  For example, the Department of Transportation implements 
Section 4(f)’s environmental requirements in conjunction with its broader administration 
of transportation funding under the Department of Transportation Act, see, e.g., Laguna 
Greenbelt, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 42 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994); and the Department of 
Agriculture implements Swampbuster’s environmental requirements in conjunction with 
its broader administration of farm subsidy programs, see, e.g., Gunn v. U.S. Dept. of 
Agric., 118 F.3d 1233 (8th Cir. 1997).  In both types of situations, the presence of the 
environmental law—NEPA, the ESA, or an embedded environmental statute—integrates 
environmental concerns with other policy objectives. 
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C. Implications 
Canonical environmental law is integrated with other 
environmental law. For example, a federal regulation restricting air 
pollutant emissions from a power plant167 is integrated with other federal 
air pollution regulation—administered by the same sub-agency (EPA’s 
Office of Air and Radiation), as part of the same statutory program (Clean 
Air Act).  Canonical environmental law is segregated, however, from non-
environmental law—the same federal regulation restricting air pollutant 
emissions from a power plant is not integrated, for example, with labor 
standards168 that apply to the power plant.   
Embedded environmental law, on the other hand, is segregated 
from environmental law but integrated with some body of non-
environmental law with which it shares other attributes.  For example, 
Section 4(f) is integrated with transportation programs in the Department 
of Transportation but segregated from programs that apply to parklands.169 
Comparing embedded environmental laws and the environmental 
law canon thus implicates questions about how to organize the law—in 
essence, comparing how a particular environmental provision would 
function as part of a broader environmental statute administered by an 
agency specializing in environmental policy, with how it would function 
as part of a program focused on the regulated activity.170  One way to 
think about how law should be organized in its enactment and 
administration is in terms of complementarities of function, which can be 
used to decide whether functions should be coordinated or administered 
independently.171  Where functions are complementary, there are likely to 
                                                 
167 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.40Da-.52Da (setting forth Standards of Performance for 
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units). 
168 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 531.1-.60 (regulating wage payments under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938). 
169 In this respect, NEPA and the Endangered Species Act operate differently than other 
statutes in the environmental law canon.  See supra Part I.B.2.  Because much of the 
responsibility for implementing NEPA and, albeit to a lesser extent, the Endangered 
Species Act rests with non-environmental agencies implementing what are otherwise 
non-environmental programs, see supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text, the 
administration of NEPA and the Endangered Species Act resembles the administration of 
an embedded environmental law.  When NEPA requires the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development to prepare an Environmental Assessment before approving a housing 
redevelopment project, for example, it is as if NEPA has been embedded in HUD’s 
housing program.  This is not just a question of overlapping application, as it would be 
with a Clean Water Act requirement that applied to the housing project.  NEPA integrates 
into HUD’s program, actually becoming part of the agency’s process for approving the 
housing project. 
170 Cf. Eric Biber, The More the Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of 
Administrative Law Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78, 79 (2012) (“A key question is 
whether you want to manage the externality-causing activity separately from the 
externality, or together.”). 
171 See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending 
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 988-97 (2004). 
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be benefits from coordinating those functions.172  Embedded 
environmental law offers the possibility that, in a particular situation, there 
may be greater complementarity of function among certain environmental 
and non-environmental provisions that govern the same activity than 
among environmental provisions that govern a particular type of 
environmental harm. 
Lawmakers producing environmental law choose—whether 
deliberately or inadvertently—what form the law should take.  In choosing 
whether to address an environmental problem by adding a new provision 
modeled on the environmental law canon or by enacting a new embedded 
environmental provision, lawmakers should carefully consider the 
implications of the differences between the two. 
The remainder of this section compares how the differences in the 
features of canonical and embedded environmental laws affect the ways in 
which they function legally, institutionally, and politically.  The purpose 
of this functional comparison is not to claim that embedded environmental 
law is categorically superior to canonical environmental law, or vice versa.  
Rather, the specific context in which a law applies determines whether a 
particular functional characteristic poses an advantage or disadvantage. 
1. Legal Functions 
Ideally laws would exhibit an attribute of comprehensive and 
complete coherence—that is, perfect coherence across all possible axes of 
comparison.  A federal statute regulating air pollutant emissions from 
coal-fired power plants, for example, ideally would be entirely coherent 
with other federal air pollution regulation; with other federal 
environmental regulation; with other federal non-environmental regulation 
of power plants and of the electricity they generate; and with state and 
local environmental and non-environmental regulation of power plants.  
Without such coherence, laws can work inefficiently, operate at cross-
purposes, or even conflict. 
Purposeful coherence, however, is costly to attain.  It requires 
coordination—potentially, coordination at every stage of the legal process:  
during the enactment of the legislation, during the agency proceedings to 
implement the legislation, and during the enforcement process.  
Comprehensive and complete coherence across the entire web of 
interrelated laws is infeasible.  Realistically, then, coherence will be 
limited at best, and lawmakers face a tradeoff in deciding what coherence 
to prioritize. 
The way in which the law is organized increases the salience of 
certain of its characteristics, thereby facilitating the coherence of laws that 
share those characteristics.  A massive environmental statute such as the 
Clean Air Act may be sprawling, complex, and far from comprehensively 
                                                 
172 Id.  Assessing functional complementarity with any specificity, however, can be very 
difficult.  Id. at 997. 
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coherent, but it exhibits certain discernible internal patterns.  Accordingly 
a regulatory provision within the Clean Air Act is more likely to be 
coherent with other provisions of the Act than with a provision of another 
statute.  Similarly, a provision of a Farm Bill is more likely to be coherent 
with another provision of the Farm Bill than with the Clean Water Act. 
The relative merit of creating a new environmental provision as 
part of an environmental statute or by embedding it in a non-
environmental statute thus depends in significant part on whether greater 
value in the particular situation seems to arise from coherence with other 
environmental laws or coherence with other non-environmental laws that 
address the same conduct.  Canonical environmental law—environmental 
law organized with other environmental law—is more likely to produce 
internal coherence and consistency within the field of environmental law.  
Embedded environmental law—environmental law organized with other 
non-environmental law—is more likely to generate coherence and 
consistency in the law of the field in which it is embedded. 
The benefits of coherence, moreover, likely increase as the 
concentration of regulation in the sector increases.173  Thus, in 
ascertaining whether a new environmental policy would function better if 
enacted within existing environmental programs (canonical environmental 
law) or with other non-environmental programs targeting the same 
industry (embedded environmental law), policymakers should compare the 
relative intensity of regulation in each sphere, all else equal favoring 
placement of the new law in the more intense sphere, at what one might 
call the regulatory center of gravity. 
Thus, it makes sense to regulate corporate disclosure of 
environmental liabilities as part of a program regulating corporate 
disclosures rather than as part of a program focusing on environmental 
liabilities.174  Existing securities laws intensively regulate other, non-
environmentally related corporate disclosures.175  On the other hand, 
although environmental regulatory programs such as CERCLA create 
environmental liabilities, they do not generally regulate the disclosure of 
such liabilities.  The center of regulatory gravity for corporate disclosure 
of environmental liability, and accordingly the likely greatest benefit from 
coherence, is located within the programs regulating corporate disclosures 
(embedded environmental law) rather than within environmental 
regulatory programs (canonical environmental law). 
In weighing the relative merits of organizing new environmental 
law with existing environmental programs or separate from those existing 
                                                 
173 On the other hand, the costs of coordination also substantially increase as the intensity 
of regulation increases—the more there is to coordinate, the more difficult it is to 
coordinate. 
174 See, e.g., Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 
Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010); see generally John W. Bagby et. al., How Green Was My 
Balance Sheet?: Corporate Liability and Environmental Disclosure, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
225 (1995). 
175 See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. pt. 229. 
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programs, the relative conduciveness of each form to innovation may be 
an important consideration.  In particular, coherence with existing law can 
be a drag on innovation.  By its very nature, coherence pushes in the 
direction of conformity rather than diversity.  The framework of existing 
statutes therefore constrains options for regulatory innovation within those 
programs.176  Even statutory amendments usually accomplish only 
incremental change.177  Thus, addressing an environmental problem by 
making changes within the environmental law canon will likely result in a 
new environmental law that looks more like existing environmental law 
than if the problem is addressed by enacting a new provision of embedded 
environmental law, separate from the extant canon.  Embedded 
environmental law, less burdened by the need to conform to existing 
environmental programs, provides a structure more conducive to 
experimentation and policy innovation than are canonical environmental 
statutes. 
Another important consideration is the organization of the field 
into which the environmental provision is embedded.  Just as 
environmental law has its own internal organization,178 other fields do as 
well, probably including some hierarchical order of prominence.  The 
effectiveness of an environmental provision embedded into another field 
likely depends on how the environmental provision integrates with the 
field.  To the extent the other field has canonical statutes with heightened 
salience within that field, and concomitant higher levels of attention and 
resources, an environmental provision embedded within one of those 
canonical statutes would likely be more efficacious than if it were 
embedded in a less prominent statute.  The effect of the Swampbuster 
provision of the Food Security Act and of Section 4(f) of the Department 
of Transportation Act are enhanced, for example, because the Food 
Security Act—a Farm Bill—and the Department of Transportation Act are 
canonical within their respective fields of agricultural law and 
transportation law.  On the other hand, precisely because of the salience of 
a canonical statute within its field, it may be politically more difficult to 
embed an environmental provision in a canonical statute of another field 
than in a statute that is more obscure to the field. 
2. Institutional Functions 
Embedded environmental law also differs fundamentally from the 
environmental law canon because the agencies that administer embedded 
                                                 
176 See Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation: The Case 
for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL. L. 457, 480 (1996) (noting that “a truly new 
regulatory system cannot be implemented within the existing legal framework”). 
177 Even the massive and dramatic Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101–
549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990), which significantly revamped the Clean Air Act and was 
many times longer than the original Clean Air Act of 1970, for the most part added new 
elements to existing programs and did not replace the existing statutory programs. 
178 See supra Part I.B. 
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environmental laws differ from EPA.  EPA is the acknowledged 
environmental expert and specialist in the Executive Branch.  The 
agency’s mission focuses on environmental protection.179  Even for 
programs that Congress delegates to another agency, as to issues that 
implicate environmental concerns Congress often directs the 
implementing agency to coordinate with EPA.180  EPA has accumulated a 
staff of thousands of environmental experts with which no other federal 
agency can compete.181 
Embedded environmental law thus poses institutional challenges, 
because it puts environmental lawmaking in the hands of administrative 
agencies that lack experience and expertise—and perhaps motivation as 
well—in addressing environmental protection.  For many agencies, 
environmental protection is a secondary goal, and potentially perceived to 
be at odds with the agency’s other, primary goals.182  Based on these 
factors, it might seem that delegating an environmental program to an 
agency other than EPA would invariably pose a disadvantage to the 
effectiveness of the program. 
But EPA is far from perfect.  It is already overburdened with 
existing statutory mandates.183  It is highly bureaucratic in ways that may 
impair its ability to respond with speed and agility to new policy 
challenges.184  Violent swings of the political pendulum have left the 
agency with what William Ruckelshaus, its first Administrator, has called 
“battered agency syndrome.”185  EPA also has traditionally concentrated 
on pollution and public health; the agency may have less institutional 
advantage in addressing environmental problems that lie outside of these 
realms. 
                                                 
179 EPA, Our Mission and What We Do, http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/whatwedo.html 
(“The mission of EPA is to protect human health and the environment.”). 
180 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 349 (directing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
consult with EPA after it has issued a new drinking water regulation under the Safe 
Drinking Water Act regarding whether to promulgate regulations applying the EPA 
regulation to bottled drinking water). 
181 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
REPORT NO. 11-P-0136, EPA NEEDS BETTER AGENCY-WIDE CONTROLS OVER STAFF 
RESOURCES (Feb. 22, 2011) (reporting that the agency employed somewhat over 18,000 
people during Fiscal Years 2006-2010). 
182 See Todd S. Aagaard, A Functional Approach to Risks and Uncertainties under 
NEPA, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 87, 115 (2012); cf. Eric Biber, Too Many Things 
to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1, 6-30 (2009) (describing the tendency of multiple-goal agencies to focus on 
certain primary goals at the expense of secondary goals). 
183 See Lakshman Guruswamy, Integration & Biocomplexity, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1191, 
1233 (2001) (referring to EPA as “harassed and overburdened”); William D. 
Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec. 1995, at 25, 26 (“Any senior 
EPA official will tell you that the agency has the resources to do not much more than ten 
percent of the things Congress has charged it to do.”). 
184 See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S16845 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Sen. 
Baucus) (criticizing “EPA’s bloated bureaucratic process”) 
185 Ruckelshaus, supra note 192, at 25. 
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Moreover, despite their relative lack of expertise on environmental 
issues, non-environmental agencies may better understand the non-
environmental dimensions of a problem.  Drawing again on the example 
of corporate disclosures of environmental liabilities,186 the SEC may not 
have EPA’s deep expertise on issues environmental liability, but it has 
much stronger experience than EPA on issues of corporate disclosure, and 
that expertise may be more relevant than environmental expertise to the 
overall success of corporate disclosures of environmental liabilities. 
Other agencies also may be more willing and able to depart from 
the environmental law canon’s paradigm that dominates EPA.  Agencies 
are notorious for their predilection toward the status quo and against 
dramatic change.187  Delegating a new environmental program to EPA, an 
agency with an existing heavy environmental docket, is thus likely to 
result in a new program that strongly resembles existing EPA programs.  
Delegating a new environmental program to an agency such as the 
Department of Agriculture, which focuses far less on environmental 
regulation, puts the agency in a position of writing policy on a relatively 
cleaner slate.  At the very least, the institutional tendencies of a non-
environmental agency such as the Department of Agriculture are likely to 
be based on its existing programs that differ significantly from the 
environmental law canon.  The Swampbuster provision of the Food 
Security Act, for example, has features consistent with existing agriculture 
programs built around subsidy programs but functions quite differently 
from the Clean Water Act’s wetlands program.188 
The prospect of dispersing environmental programs across 
agencies throughout the federal government may induce concerns of 
fragmentation, which “can yield conflicting policies that frustrate each 
other, or duplicative policies that waste effort . . . [or] gaps [that are] 
unaddressed.”189  But all regulation is fragmented across some 
dimensions, and so delegating all federal regulatory authority over 
environmental issues to EPA would fragment environmental regulations 
from other non-environmental regulations that apply to the same industry.  
Even environmental programs are generally fragmented by environmental 
media.   
                                                 
186 See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text. 
187 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2263 (2001) 
(noting bureaucracies’ tendency toward “inertia and torpor”) 
188 See Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
189 Jonathan B. Wiener, Radiative Forcing:  Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in 
Environmental Law, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 210, 218 (2008).  For other examples of the 
ample academic literature noting the problems of fragmentation, see, e.g., James M. 
Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. 
& ECON. 1, 11-12 (2000); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared 
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1147-48 (2012); Samuel J. Rascoff & 
Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in 
Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI L. REV. 1763, 1814-15 
(2002). 
 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OUTSIDE THE CANON 38 
The question, then, is not whether to fragment regulatory 
programs—they must be fragmented—but rather which shared features to 
organize together and which to fragment.  Fragmenting across some 
dimensions—for example, allocating regulatory authority over 
environmental problems across multiple agencies—may allow integrating 
others, such as coordinated environmental and non-environmental 
regulation of a particular sector.  
In sum, the question of whether an environmental or non-
environmental agency would most effectively administer an 
environmental provision does not as clearly favor the environmental 
agency as one might initially assume.  Environmental agencies have the 
advantage of environmental expertise and focus, but non-environmental 
agencies offer their own advantages.  In particular, the organization of 
embedded environmental laws190 and their institutional setting191 may 
work in combination to free embedded environmental laws from the 
constraints of existing environmental regulatory systems and provide 
circumstances conducive for experimental environmental lawmaking and 
closer coordination with non-environmental programs. 
3. Political Functions 
As political conditions such as the degree of partisanship and the 
particular parties in power of the Presidency and Congress change, the 
viability of different forms of legislation changes as well.  Differences in 
the features of embedded environmental laws and the environmental law 
canon lead them to function differently politically, in ways that likely 
affect their relative political viability. 
First, the mere existence of an alternative to the canonical form of 
environmental law increases the political viability of enacting some new 
environmental law.  EPA and its canonical regulatory programs have 
sometimes been192—as they are currently193—a political lightning rod.  
The backlash against EPA represents not only resistance to concrete 
aspects of the agency’s specific programs, but also considerable use of 
EPA as a symbol of excessive and heavy-handed regulation more 
generally.  Such conditions pose a substantial obstacle to any legislation 
that would attempt to invest EPA with additional authority, and also 
reduces the agency’s ability to effectively implement its existing 
authorities.  In such circumstances, environmental legislation in the 
canonical form is politically infeasible.194  Environmental provisions 
                                                 
190 See supra Part II.C.1. 
191 See supra Part II.C.2. 
192 See William D. Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec. 1995, at 
25, 25 (describing a pattern of alternating “pro-environmental excess” and “anti-
environmental excess” that caused EPA to suffer from “battered agency syndrome”). 
193 See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also infra note 233. 
194 Environmental legislation may, however, be more politically viable than alternatives.  
Pennsylvania’s recently enacted Act 13 governing natural gas drilling in the state imposes 
charges on unconventional natural gas wells.  The Republican governor, Tom Corbett, 
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within larger non-environmental legislation that delegates to agencies 
other than EPA, on the other hand, may remain viable. 
Even in circumstances in which Congress might be willing to 
invest EPA with additional new authority, embedded environmental 
legislation may remain politically attractive.  In conferring authority on 
EPA, Congress may be concerned whether the agency will be willing and 
able to act on its delegated authority.195  Congress can mitigate the risk of 
EPA implementation failure, or indeed implementation failure by any 
particular agency, by legislating across multiple fronts—e.g., multiple 
embedded environmental laws administered by different agencies, or both 
canonical and embedded environmental laws—thereby improving the 
likelihood that some policy to address the problem will be 
implemented.196  Delegating environmental laws across a broader range of 
institutions could allow other agencies to implement substitute policies 
when EPA is stymied. 
Second, the politics of embedded environmental laws differ from 
the politics of the environmental law canon because embedded 
environmental laws are part of legislation and programs that do not focus 
overall on environmental protection.  Major legislation focused on 
environmental protection generally has no advantages over the status quo 
to offer the would-be regulated industries, as a result of which the 
regulated industries generally have strong incentive to attempt to kill 
environmental legislation.197  Some state governments, moreover, may 
resist large-scale expansions of federal environmental regulation that 
displaces more lenient state-level regulation and pressures state 
                                                                                                                         
has successfully defended the charges as an impact fee rather than a tax. See Brad 
Bumsted, Corbett Disputes Claim that Impact Fee Is Tax, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Nov. 
22, 2011 (noting Governor Corbett’s argument that the levy on unconventional natural 
gas drilling is not a tax but “a fee to cover government costs associated with drilling”).  
But see Elizabeth Stelle & Nathan Benefield, What's the Difference Between a Tax and a 
Fee?, Commonwealth Foundation (May 31, 2011), 
http://www.commonwealthfoundation.org/policyblog/detail/whats-the-difference-
between-a-tax-and-a-fee (arguing that “there are many reasons why [the impact fee] more 
closely represents a tax than a fee”).  Evidently new taxes can be even more politically 
combustible than new environmental regulation. 
195 Cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 923, 990 n.84 (2008) (“The EPA's pattern of missing statutory deadlines 
has been well documented.”). 
196 See Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory 
Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 292-94 (2011) (noting that redundant 
delegations of regulatory authority can increase the likelihood of successful regulatory 
action). 
197 But see RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING 
OURSELVES:  A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 209 (2d ed. 2006) 
(noting that industries in the 1960s “acquired a powerful new interest in obtaining 
moderate and uniform federal standards that would preempt more stringent and 
inconsistent state and local standards,” laying the foundation for a national Clean Air 
Act). 
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governments into assisting in implementation.198  Embedded 
environmental provisions, by contrast, are contained within statutes that 
focus on goals other than environmental protection, many of which may 
be advantageous to an industry.  Thus, for example, the Food Security 
Act199 contained two environmental provisions—known as Sodbuster200 
and Swampbuster201—that condition farmers’ eligibility for many Federal 
farm program benefits on minimum standards of protection for certain 
environmentally sensitive lands.202  Although farmers may have opposed 
the Sodbuster and Swampbuster restrictions in isolation, the overall Food 
Security Act included numerous provisions, such as price supports and 
farm loans, that benefited farmers.203 
Third, the political stakes will tend to be smaller for embedded 
environmental laws than for major environmental legislation.  Embedded 
environmental laws tend to impose lighter economic burdens on a 
narrower range of regulatory targets, and therefore invite less political 
opposition than a major environmental statute.  By contrast, even a 
relatively insignificant amendment to a canonical environmental statute 
can implicate large political stakes, because one attempt to amend a statute 
can be perceived to create opportunities for other amendments to the 
statute, quickly escalating the stakes for what started as a proposal for a 
small change.204  Thus, the same provision could be politically far less 
combustible in terms of environmental politics as a provision of a larger 
piece of non-environmental legislation than as an amendment to a major 
environmental statute.  On the other hand, the politics of the other field 
into which an embedded environmental law is inserted are important as 
well.  Embedding environmental provisions in non-environmental 
legislation is likely to be more politically viable than amending a major 
environmental statute primarily in situations in which the non-
                                                 
198 See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and 
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1995) (“State and local governments 
argue that federal regulations infringe on their autonomy and sovereignty, and that they 
impose costly unfunded mandates states can ill afford.”). 
199 Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985). 
200 Id. § 1211-1213, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-3813. 
201 Id. § 1221-1223, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-3823. 
202 Sodbuster denies eligibility to farmers who convert highly erodible land to crop 
production without an approved soil conservation system. 16 U.S.C. § 3811. 
Swampbuster denies eligibility to farmers who convert a wetland to crop production. 16 
U.S.C. § 3821. 
203 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 401, 99 Stat. at 1395-1406 (providing loan program 
for feed grains); id. § 801, 99 Stat. at 1441-43 (providing price support for soybeans). 
204 Cf. Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation: The Case 
for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL. L. 457, 480 (1996) (“None of these 
constituencies is willing to abandon the existing legal and regulatory framework without 
assurances that their agendas will be protected.”); Roger P. Hansen & Theodore A. 
Wolff, Reviewing NEPA's Past: Improving NEPA's Future, 13 ENVT. PRAC. 235 (2011) 
(“The problem with amending NEPA is that it opens a Pandora’s box of amendments 
offered by vocal NEPA opponents to weaken, water down, or even eliminate NEPA or its 
effectiveness.”). 
 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OUTSIDE THE CANON 41 
environmental legislation falls within a field in which there is less political 
controversy than in environmental policy.205 
Fourth, the fact that embedded environmental law is dispersed and 
involves comparatively low stakes may make it a more difficult target for 
political organizing by interest groups.  This may give Congress and 
agencies more discretion and autonomy in making environmental law out 
of the political spotlight.  The difficulties of political organizing with 
regard to embedded environmental laws may, however, disproportionately 
burden environmental groups.  Industry groups likely are already well 
organized with respect to the various congressional committees and 
agencies that regulate them and who would be responsible for new 
embedded environmental laws—for example, the congressional 
agriculture committees.  Environmental groups, on the other hand, would 
tend to be better organized and familiar with the committees and agencies 
responsible for canonical environmental law—for example, the House 
Natural Resources Committee and the Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee.  Moreover, whereas EPA is sometimes accused of 
exhibiting bias against industry,206 sector-specific agencies such as the 
Department of Agriculture and Department of Transportation are often 
characterized as captured by their respective industries.207  Thus, 
embedded environmental laws may tend to be less stringent than 
environmental laws in a canonical form.  But canonical environmental 
legislation is often not politically viable; embedded environmental laws 
may sometimes be the only available option. 
Despite the potential advantages of embedded environmental laws, 
one type of embedded environmental law—appropriations riders—
exemplifies the potential downsides to non-canonical environmental 
legislation.  Appropriations riders are isolated legislative provisions 
attached to larger appropriations bills to take advantage of the larger bill’s 
political momentum and the relative lack of process and deliberation in 
appropriations legislation.208  Environmental appropriations riders, often 
                                                 
205 How the embedded environmental law fits into the field in which it is embedded also 
affects its political viability.  The political difficulty of embedding an environmental 
provision in a statute of another field likely increases as the salience of the statute in the 
other field increases, although the efficacy of an environmental provision embedded in a 
statute of another field likely also increases as the salience of the statute in the other field 
increases.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
206 See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS MINORITY STAFF, 
EPA’S ANTI-INDUSTRIAL POLICY: “THREATENING JOBS AND AMERICA’S 
MANUFACTURING BASE” (Sept.  28, 2010).  But see Jeff Nesmith, Senators Attack 
Mercury Proposal, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 13, 2004 (reporting senators’ allegation 
that proposed EPA regulation showed pro-industry bias). 
207 See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 
ARK. L. REV. 23, 104 n.148 (1994) (contending that industry-specific agencies are 
susceptible to capture by their respective industries) 
208 Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in 
Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 635-36 (2006).  Perhaps the most (in)famous 
environmental appropriations rider is the Energy and Water Development Appropriation 
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creating exemptions from environmental requirements, have proliferated 
in recent decades,209 roughly coinciding with the ongoing legislative 
stagnation on broader environmental legislation.  As Richard Lazarus has 
observed, this development represents a trend away from “coherent, 
comprehensive environmental legislation” and toward appropriations 
riders as an important form of environmental legislation, a development 
that Lazarus criticizes as “nondeliberative, back-door, private dealmaking” 
that undermines deliberative democracy.210 
Although environmental appropriations riders pose a cautionary 
example regarding the potential for democratically unsound embedded 
environmental laws, many embedded environmental laws do not share the 
defects of appropriations riders.  Embedded environmental laws such as 
Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act211 and the 
Swampbuster and Sodbuster provisions of the Food Security Act212 
embody constructive environmental policies enacted through a standard 
legislative process.  Accordingly, the example of environmental 
appropriations riders serves as a cautionary reminder to how embedded 
environmental laws can be misused, but does not support a categorical 
critique of embedded environmental laws. 
D. Weighing Advantages and Disadvantages 
As the discussion in Part II.C indicates, the distinctive features of 
noncanonical environmental laws present both benefits and costs in terms 
of effectiveness, and each of the potentially useful features of embedded 
environmental laws has a possible downside as well: 
 Embedding environmental law provisions in non-environmental 
statutes and programs may result in more coherence among those 
laws, but perhaps at the cost of inconsistency with other 
environmental laws.   
                                                                                                                         
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437, 449-50 (1979), which overrode the 
Supreme Court’s decision in  Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) 
holding that the Endangered Species Act prohibited completion of the Tellico Dam 
project in Tennessee because it would destroy the endangered snail darter’s habitat. 
209 Id. at 640-47.   
210 Id. at 622; see also Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar 
of Appropriations Riders:  A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 476 
(1997). But see Scott H. Segal & Jonathan H. Adler, Appropriations Riders and 
Environmental Reform:  How Appropriate? 13 (Competitive Enterprise Institute 
Environmental Discussion Paper 95-3, Sept. 15, 1995) (arguing that appropriations riders 
are a beneficial “means of holding unresponsive agencies in check”).  Not all 
environmental appropriations riders are “anti-environmental.”  See, e.g., Department of 
the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-54, §§ 104-106, 119 Stat. 499, 521-22 (2007) (restricting offshore oil and gas leasing 
in certain areas); H.R. Rep. No. 111-316, at 109 (2009) (directing EPA “to carry out a 
study on the relationship between hydraulic fracturing and drinking water”). 
211 49 U.S.C. § 303. 
212 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-3813, 3821-3823. 
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 Delegating environmental protection to agencies other than EPA 
may broaden the scope of environmental law and policy, but other 
agencies may lack expertise to understand complex environmental 
issues or commitment to environmental protection.   
 Non-environmental agencies may enjoy a less acrimonious 
relationship with the private sector, but they also may be less 
assertive regulators as well.   
 Dispersed programs may be more agile and conducive to 
experimentation, but they also may be more susceptible to 
regulatory capture and may exhibit the disadvantages of 
fragmentation. 
Because of their potential downsides, embedded environmental 
laws as a category do not always function better than canonical 
environmental laws.  In many circumstances, the ideal environmental 
statute may take the form of “comprehensive environmental legislation” 
that Richard Lazarus rightly lauds as the backbone of American 
environmental policy.213  But broad canonical environmental statutes are 
not necessarily more effective than embedded environmental provisions in 
every instance.  And even when perhaps theoretically preferable, 
canonical environmental legislation often is politically not viable.  Thus, 
embedded environmental law provides a superior alternative to canonical 
environmental law either where it is functionally superior to canonical 
environmental law or where canonical environmental law is not available. 
In addition to the possibility of substituting for canonical 
environmental law, embedded environmental laws also can serve as a 
valuable supplement to canonical environmental laws.  Here are two 
examples of environmental laws administered by non-environmental 
agencies and embedded within non-environmental programs, working 
synergistically with canonical environmental statutes administered by 
EPA. 
First, the Internal Revenue Code imposes an excise tax on ozone-
depleting chemicals, with the amount of the tax increasing over time and 
with the ozone-depleting potential of the substance.214  The excise tax, 
enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,215 
                                                 
213 Lazarus, supra note 208, at 622. 
214 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681-4682; see also 26 C.F.R. § 52.4682–1. 
215 Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989).  The tax came to be enacted through an 
“almost serendipitous consensus.”  Thomas A. Barthold, Issues in the Design of 
Environmental Excise Taxes, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 136-37 (1994).  The World 
Resources Institute had advocated for a tax on ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons in a 
1986 report.  J. Andrew Hoerner, Taxing Pollution, in OZONE PROTECTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 39, 39 (Elizabeth Cook, ed. 1996).  In 1989, President George H.W. 
Bush, following an earlier similar proposal from EPA under the Reagan Administration, 
see 53 Fed. Reg. 30,604 (Aug. 12, 1988) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking asking 
for public comment on a possible fee or auction for ozone-depleting substances), 
proposed to restrict the consumption and production of chemicals that deplete 
stratospheric ozone by auctioning the rights to produce such chemicals.  See Barthold, 
supra, at 136-37.  Meanwhile, a Congressional Budget Resolution had directed the House 
 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OUTSIDE THE CANON 44 
supplements other regulatory initiatives, undertaken pursuant to the 
Montreal Protocol and enacted as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990, that directly limit production and consumption of ozone-depleting 
substances.216  Some have concluded the excise tax has been “probably 
more effective in eliminating the production of offending chemicals than 
the regulatory provisions” it was intended to supplement.217  
Second, a provision of the Federal Aid Highways Act218 
establishes the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality (CMAQ) Program, 
which authorizes the Department of Transportation to use federal 
transportation funding to support transportation projects that contribute to 
air quality improvements.219  Some specific elements of the program 
specifically target projects that contribute to a state’s efforts to attain a 
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) under the Clean Air 
Act.220  The CMAQ Program is consistent with a provision in the Clean 
Air Act prohibiting any “department, agency, or instrumentality of the 
Federal Government” from approving or assisting “any activity” that does 
not conform to a state’s efforts, through a state implementation plan (SIP), 
to attain a National Ambient Air Quality Standard.221  The CMAQ 
Program, however, goes beyond merely prohibiting efforts that undermine 
air quality and provides affirmative support for projects that improve air 
quality.  Congress added the CMAQ Program to the Federal Aid 
Highways Act as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency 
Act of 1991.222 
Embedded environmental laws also work synergistically with 
NEPA, a canonical environmental statute not administered by EPA.  When 
NEPA and embedded environmental laws apply in conjunction with each 
                                                                                                                         
Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee to raise more revenue.  
See id. at 137; Hoerner, supra, at 41.  Individual members of both committees already 
had proposed bills that included taxes on ozone-depleting substances, motivated in part to 
raise revenue and in part to address ozone depletion.  See Barthold, supra, at 137; 
Hoerner, supra, at 40-41.  The convergence of efforts to limit ozone-depleting and an 
objective to raise tax revenue created conditions conducive to the bipartisan support that 
enacted the excise tax.  See Barhold, supra, at 137.  The dual objectives of the tax—to 
protect the ozone layer and to raise revenue—highlight how the tax, like other embedded 
environmental laws, falls within the fields of both tax law and environmental law. 
216 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 (Aug. 12, 1988).  The Clean Air Act provisions are codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671m.  
217 John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National 
Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 93 (1998). 
218 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-190. 
219 23 U.S.C. § 149. 
220 See 23 U.S.C. § 149(b)(1)(A)(i). 
221 42 U.S.C. § 7506; see generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Improving Transportation-
Related Air Quality Under the Clean Air Act's Conformity Requirement and the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 631 (1997) 
(describing the background of this conformity requirement). 
222 Pub. L. No. 102-240, § 1008, 105 Stat. 1914, 1932 (1991). 
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other,223  NEPA’s primary contribution differs from its usual role of 
integrating environmental concerns with other policy objectives.  The 
embedded environmental laws already put environmental concerns on the 
agency’s agenda.  NEPA, however, integrates embedded environmental 
laws into a broader body of environmental law—NEPA law—that 
establishes a process and framework for considering environmental 
concerns.  This process and framework are especially important for 
agencies that lack significant environmental experience and expertise.  At 
the same time, because NEPA’s dictates are broad and only procedural, it 
allows agencies the flexibility to tailor their NEPA processes to their own 
specific statutory directives.  NEPA essentially provides institutional 
support for the implementation of embedded environmental laws.224 
Together, these three examples illustrate how embedded 
environmental statutory provisions can supplement and complement 
canonical environmental statutes.  Even if they will never and should 
never fully displace conventional environmental laws, noncanonical 
environmental laws deserve consideration as a potentially useful tool in 
the environmental law toolbox. 
E. Looking Forward:  Three Challenges for Next-Generation 
Environmental Law 
Although to date embedded environmental law has been 
overshadowed by the environmental law canon, it has the potential to play 
a much more significant role in environmental law moving forward.  In 
particular, embedded environmental law, by virtue of its differences from 
the environmental law canon, offers an alternative model for 
environmental lawmaking that may complement, or even to some extent 
substitute for, more conventional policy responses in addressing the major 
challenges currently facing environmental law.  Part II.E will discuss the 
potential application of embedded environmental law to meeting three 
such challenges:  legislative stagnation, integration with non-
environmental law, and climate change.  The attributes of embedded 
environmental law identified in Part II.B make embedded environmental 
laws a valuable and perhaps essential component of an effective solution 
to these challenges. 
                                                 
223 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 613 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 
2010) (applying NEPA and the Plant Protection Act to the Department of Agriculture’s 
regulation of importation of solid wood packaging material); Laguna Greenbelt, 42 F.3d 
517 (applying NEPA and Section 4(f) to the Federal Highway Administration’s approval 
of a tollroad project). 
224 This is not to say, however, that an agency can or should attempt to meld the statutes 
entirely.  See, e.g., Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 203 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991) (noting that, “[a]lthough an agency's analysis under NEPA and the 
Transportation Act might proceed in similar tracks, the two statutes are not precisely the 
same,” and proceeding to identify differences therein). 
 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OUTSIDE THE CANON 46 
1. Stagnation 
Environmental law, at least in Congress, has stagnated.  Canonical 
environmental legislation, by virtue of the size of the programs it enacts 
and the costs it imposes on the industries it regulates, automatically 
generates resistance and therefore requires tremendous political support to 
be enacted.  The landmark federal environmental statutes that comprise 
the environmental law canon required—and received—broad bipartisan 
support in Congress when they were enacted in the 1970s.  Support for 
environmental protection was a consensus issue.225 
Political conditions have changed dramatically since the 1970s.  
Commentators describe a climate of “bitter partisan gridlock” 226 and a 
“starkly partisan divide”227 on environmental issues in Congress.  Since 
the 1970s Democrats and Republicans in Congress have sharply diverged 
in their support for environmental protection.228  Environmental issues 
have become a proxy for an ideological battle over the appropriate extent 
of federal regulatory authority.229  “What began in 1970 as a relatively 
bipartisan political issue has become, thirty years later, a largely partisan 
issue about which there is little common ground between the two political 
parties . . . .”230 
Whatever the causes of the loss of political consensus and the 
increasing politicization of environmental issues at the federal level,231 the 
current political context is highly inhospitable to the enactment of major 
environmental legislation and has been so for quite some time.  Indeed, 
environmental lawmaking in Congress has been largely at an impasse for 
two decades now.  The last major federal environmental statute was the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.232  The impasse shows no signs of 
                                                 
225 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 8, at 224 (noting that in the early 1970s “solidly 
bipartisan majorities [in Congress] vested this new agency [EPA] with sweeping new 
powers”); Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1003 n.17 (noting the “sweeping majorities” and 
“lopsided votes” that enacted environmental statutes in the 1970s).  This is not to imply 
that the enactment of major federal environmental statutes during these periods was non-
political.  See generally, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN 
COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981). 
226  Andrews, supra note 8, at 255 (“For the present, it is clear that any hope of significant 
environmental policy reform in Congress continues to be held hostage to bitter partisan 
gridlock . . . .”). 
227 Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1004 (“Today, however, a starkly partisan divide exists in 
environmental law.”). 
228 Id. at 1012-13. 
229 See Andrews, supra note 8, at 238. 
230 Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1019. 
231 See ANDREWS, supra note 197, at 350-51 (discussing some causes, including a 
reassertion of organized opposition from business interests, passive public support, and 
the use of the environment as a symbolic issue). 
232 Pub. L. No. 101–549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).  Congress enacted two somewhat 
significant environmental statutes in 1996—the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489; and the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613—but neither would qualify as part of the 
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abating; if anything, the prospects for significant new federal 
environmental legislation seem bleaker than ever.  EPA has become a 
political lightning rod, a target for ridicule by Republican political 
candidates and congressional leaders.233  In the face of congressional 
inaction, EPA is forced to use old statutes to address new environmental 
issues. 
In the current era of extreme partisanship and political stalemate, 
especially in environmental policy, embedded environmental law’s 
distinctive features are likely to give it more political viability than 
canonical environmental law.  Embedded environmental laws avoid EPA, 
instead delegating authority to agencies such as the Department of 
Agriculture that may enjoy more bipartisan support in Congress.  
Embedded environmental laws can be part of a legislative package, such 
as an energy policy bill or farm bill, that contains many elements 
advantageous to industry.  Embedded environmental laws involve smaller 
political stakes, and are more conducive to innovative and experimental 
policy solutions that may enjoy broader political appeal. 
Recent legislative events support the proposition that 
environmental laws outside the canon may be more politically viable than 
environmental laws in a canonical form.  Despite the legislative gridlock 
of the last decade, Congress recently has enacted some significant—not 
major, but nevertheless significant—pieces of environmental legislation: 
 The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Reauthorization Act of 2006234 amended and reauthorized the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act,235 
the primary federal statute regulating fisheries.236 
 The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008,237 also known 
as the 2008 Farm Bill, contained a provision that significantly 
amended the Lacey Act,238 a 1900 statute that prohibits trafficking 
in illegal fish, wildlife, or plants.  The 2008 amendments expanded 
the Lacey Act’s scope to include more plants and plant products, 
including illegally logged timber.239 
                                                                                                                         
environmental law canon, a major environmental law on the order of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 or the landmark legislation of the 1970s. 
233 See, e.g., Robin Bravender & Gabriel Nelson, Republicans Blitz Obama Over EPA's 
'Anti-Industrial' Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010; John M. Broder, Bashing 
E.P.A. Is New Theme in G.O.P. Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011; John M. Broder, 
House Votes to Bar E.P.A. From Regulating Industrial Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 
2011. 
234 Pub. L. No. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007).  
235 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1891d. 
236 See Robin Kundis Craig, Taking the Long View of Ocean Ecosystems: Historical 
Science, Marine Restoration, and the Oceans Act of 2000, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 649, 668 
(2002). 
237 Pub. L. No. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1651 (2008). 
238 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378. 
239 Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 8204, 122 Stat. at 2052-56. 
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 The Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009,240 an 
amalgamation of 164 separate bills relating to public lands, among 
other things designated millions of acres of new wilderness and a 
thousand miles of new wild and scenic rivers.241 
All three of these statutes exhibit markedly non-canonical 
characteristics.  The Lacey Act amendment exemplifies the features of 
embedded environmental law.  Although the Magnuson-Stevens 
amendments and the Omnibus Public Land statute fall within the category 
of subcanonical environmental laws rather than embedded environmental 
laws, they share several key features in common with embedded 
environmental laws, and these features contribute to their political 
viability.   
First, none of these new statutes is administered by EPA.  The 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), an agency 
within the Department of Commerce, administers the Magnuson-Stevens 
Act.242  The Department of Agriculture, and specifically the Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service, enforces the new Lacey Act 
provisions.243  Various federal land management agencies, such as the 
Bureau of Land Management, Forest Service, and National Park Service, 
administer the newly designated public lands.244   
Second, all three statutes pursue additional objectives beyond 
environmental concerns—that is, they are “mixed-motive” environmental 
statutes.  The Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act includes provisions 
sought by the fishing industry to manage fisheries.245  The Lacey Act 
amendments protect U.S. timber companies from underpriced imports.246  
The Omnibus Public Land Act includes new historical parks and water 
supply projects.247   
Third, the three statutes sweep narrowly compared with canonical 
environmental statutes.  Although they are significant, fisheries 
management, illegally logged timber, and new public lands designations 
                                                 
240 Pub. L. No. 111-11, 123 Stat. 991 (2009). 
241 See Environmental News Serv., Congress Votes “Yes” to Sweeping Public Lands 
Protection Act, ENS NEWSWIRE, Mar. 25, 2009. 
242 See Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 
Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act (Aug. 2008), 
http://www.noaa.gov/factsheets/new%20version/magstevens.pdf.  
243 See, e.g., Implementation of Revised Lacey Act Provisions, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,874 (Feb. 
28, 2011). 
244 See 123 Stat. at 993-95 (identifying the agency associated with each set of new 
authorizations). 
245 See Allison A. Freeman, Attention Turns to House as Magnuson Breezes Through 
Senate, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, June 20, 2006 (quoting a statement approving elements 
of the legislation by a representative of the National Fisheries Institute, a fishing industry 
group). 
246 See Dan Berman, Illegal Timber, Omnibus Parks Bills Lead House Suspension 
Calendar, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 3, 2007. 
247 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 111-11, §§ 7001-7003, 9101-9115, 123 Stat. at 1183-89, 1298-
1321. 
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do not match the breadth of the canonical environmental statutes, which 
regulate large swaths of the American economy. 
Not only was Congress able to enact these statutes during a period 
of overall political stagnation on environmental issues, it was able to do so 
on a bipartisan basis with wide margins.  The reauthorization of 
Magnuson-Stevens was bipartisan compromise legislation, endorsed by 
both conservation groups and the fishing industry248 and passed in both 
the House and Senate by voice vote.249  The Food, Conservation, and 
Energy Act and Omnibus Public Land Act passed by wide bipartisan 
margins in both the House and Senate.250 
It is reasonable to conclude that the non-canonical character of 
these three statutes contributed to their political viability.  The absence of 
EPA from the debate, the relatively confined scope of the legislation, and 
the multiple objectives of the legislation all enabled negotiation and 
compromise that eventually resulted in passage of the statutes.  The 
absence of EPA, a political lightning rod, dampened opposition to the bills 
by reducing the political temperature of the debate.  Perhaps most 
important, the multiple objectives of the three statutes increased support 
for the bills by broadening beyond environmentalists the range of interests 
who perceived a benefit over the status quo.  Fishing interests joined 
conservationists in supporting the Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act, 
because it contained changes perceived as beneficial over the existing 
statute.  The American Forest and Paper Association joined 
environmentalists in supporting the Lacey Act amendments because it 
protected domestic timber suppliers from competition from illegally 
harvested imports.  Tribes joined environmentalists in supporting the 
Omnibus Public Land Act because it included water development projects 
beneficial to them. 
This is not to say that passage of the statutes was uncontroversial 
or nonpolitical.  The Magnuson Stevens Act required extensive 
negotiations among different camps of legislators and competing versions 
of legislation, prodded along at key points by Senator Ted Stevens, who 
was seeking a coda to his Senate career.251  The Lacey Act amendments 
                                                 
248 See Freeman, supra note 245 (noting that the legislation passed the Senate by 
unanimous consent and that “[g]roups representing the fishing industry and environment 
and ocean advocates applauded the legislation”). 
249 See Thomas, Bill Summary & Status, 109th Congress (2005-2006), H.R. 5946, Major 
Congressional Actions, available at http://thomas.loc.gov. 
250 See Thomas, Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009-2010), H.R. 146, Major 
Congressional Actions, available at http://thomas.loc.gov (noting the Omnibus Public 
Land Act passed the Senate by a 77-20 vote and the House by a 285-140 vote); H.R. 
2419 (110th): Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr2419#overview (noting the legislation 
passed the House by a 318-106 vote and the Senate by a 79-14 vote, followed by similar 
votes to override President Bush’s veto). 
251 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 245; Allison Freeman Winter, Stevens Attempts to 
Revive Magnuson with New Proposal, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 7, 2006; Allison 
Freeman Winter, Last-Gasp Attempts at Magnuson Dead in Water—Rep. Gilchrest, 
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were revised in committee to reduce compliance burdens, and languished 
in committee before finally being inserted into the broader Farm Bill.252 
The Omnibus Public Land Act triggered substantial opposition from 
Republicans.253  But, unlike recent attempts to enact canonical 
environmental legislation, these three statutes were able to overcome the 
political obstacles in their paths and to gain passage, even by wide 
margins.  In short, they succeeded where proposals for canonical 
environmental legislation have failed. 
Three anecdotal examples cannot prove a general conclusion, but 
they do provide some evidence supporting the idea that non-canonical 
environmental laws can remain politically viable during periods of strong 
partisan conflict over environmental issues when attempts to enact new 
canonical environmental laws may be thwarted.  The history of embedded 
environmental legislation provides further support for this proposition.  
Unlike canonical environmental law, which has tended to be enacted 
during a specific period from 1970 to 1990, Congress enacted embedded 
environmental laws before,254 during,255 and after256 the heyday of 
canonical environmental legislation. 
2. Integration 
Environmental law’s shortcomings can be measured by the 
mismatch that exists between environmental problems and environmental 
law.  In part because of the political stagnation on environmental issues, 
existing environmental laws do not adequately address environmental 
problems.  The Clean Water Act, for example, largely exempts nonpoint 
source discharges, even though such pollution is a major cause of impaired 
water quality.257  Meanwhile, science continues to identify new potential 
                                                                                                                         
ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 6, 2006; Lauren Morello & Allison A. Freeman, 
Magnuson-Stevens Still in Play as Activists Plan for Dem Congress, ENV’T & ENERGY 
DAILY, Nov. 10, 2006. 
252 See Berman, supra note 246. 
253 See Patrick O’Connor, House GOP Derails Public Lands Bill, POLITICO, Mar. 11, 
2009; R.J. Smith, Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 on House Floor 
Today—170 Bills in One; Half Have Had No Hearings, AMY RIDENOUR’S NATIONAL 
CENTER BLOG, Mar. 11, 2009. 
254 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931, 934 (1966) (codified as amended at 
49 U.S.C. § 303); Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1063, 1068 (1920) (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)). 
255 See Pub. L. No. 99-198, §§ 1221-1223, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985) (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-3823) (Swampbuster). 
256 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1501, 119 Stat. 594, 1067-76 (2005) 
(amending Clean Air Act § 211, 42 U.S.C. § 7545). 
257 See Jonathan Cannon, A Bargain for Clean Water, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 608, 616 
(2008) (“Unregulated nonpoint source pollution is solely responsible for failure of 30 to 
50 percent of U.S. waterbodies to meet water quality standards and is a contributing 
factor in an even larger percentage.”). 
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hazards, such as chemical toxicity at low exposure levels previously 
assumed safe.258 
Not all the mismatch between environmental problems and 
environmental law arises from a lack of law; the law itself contributes to 
some environmental problems.  Numerous laws incentivize conduct that 
causes environmental harm.  For example, tax breaks for the oil and gas 
industry subsidize fossil fuel production and therefore consumption and its 
associated air pollutant emissions.
259
 
Laws such as these that unintentionally yet significantly affect the 
environment are generally excluded from what we consider environmental 
law, because they do not deliberately address environmental concerns.260  
Yet if the project of environmental law at its most fundamental level is to 
think critically and comprehensively about the relationship between law 
and the environment, then unintentional environmental laws should be 
integral to environmental law.  Excluding laws that have inadvertent 
environmental impacts creates a problematic divide between 
environmental problems and environmental law.  Indeed, addressing 
unintentional environmental laws may well be among the most efficacious 
endeavors the field can undertake. 
As environmental law has matured, awareness has grown that the 
goal of environmental protection is highly implicated elsewhere other than 
within the domain addressed by existing canonical environmental law.  
Proposals for environmental reforms seem increasingly aimed to address 
environmental concerns as they arise outside of environmental law, such 
as in land use,261 energy262 and food production.263  Underlying these 
                                                 
258 Jody A. Roberts, Collision Course? Science, Law, and Regulation in the Emerging 
Science of Low Dose Toxicity, 20 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2009); see also Daniel A. Farber, 
Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791 (1994) 
(noting that “[t]he expansion of scientific knowledge has revealed new environmental 
problems”). 
259  See John A. Bogdanski, Reflections on the Environmental Impacts of Federal Tax 
Subsidies for Oil, Gas, and Timber Production, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323, 325-28 
(2011); Roberta Mann, Waiting to Exhale?: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1135, 1164-68 (2002); Temi Kolarova, Comment, Oil and Taxes: Refocusing the 
Tax Policy Question in the Aftermath of the BP Oil Spill, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 351, 
357-66 (2012); see generally Thomas A. Barthold, Issues in the Design of Environmental 
Excise Taxes, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 133 (1994) (noting other examples of tax provisions 
with unintentionally adverse environmental consequences). 
260 See supra note 23 (defining environmental law as laws that deliberately address 
human impacts on the environment). 
261 See, e.g., Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land 
Use Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231 (2008); John R. Nolon, 
Comparative Land Use Law: Patterns of Sustainability, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 855 
(2006). 
262 See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment 
Disconnect, supra note 30; Amy J. Wildermuth, The Next Step: The Integration of 
Energy Law and Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369 (2011). 
263 See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, Food, Law & the Environment: Informational and 
Structural Changes for A Sustainable Food System, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 263 (2011); 
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proposals is the premise that environmental concerns should suffuse the 
law generally to the same extent that environmental impacts do; wherever 
there are environmental problems, there should be environmental law.264 
Canonical environmental law does not, however, offer an attractive 
or viable model for integrating environmental concerns into the law.  
Treating canonical environmental law as the sole model for an expansion 
of environmental law would erect a substantial barrier to entry into the 
field that is unlikely to be overcome except in rare circumstances.  
Canonical environmental laws are big.  The environmental law canon 
regulates rather intensively, in terms of the burdens it places both on 
regulated parties who must comply with its requirements and on 
regulatory agencies that must administer and enforce the requirements.  
This intensity and the burdens it entails may be entirely appropriate for the 
environmental problems that the environmental law canon addresses—the 
environmental law canon has tended to focus on the most pressing 
environmental problems, which potentially call for comparatively 
intensive regulatory responses—but intense regulation is not necessarily 
appropriate for all environmental problems.  Limiting the options of 
environmental law to large, intense regulatory programs limits 
environmental law’s viable domain. 
                                                                                                                         
Neil D. Hamilton, The Role of Law in Promoting Sustainable Agriculture: Reflections on 
Ten Years of Experience in the United States, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 423 (1998); Michael 
R. Taylor, The Emerging Merger of Agricultural and Environmental Policy: Building A 
New Vision for the Future of American Agriculture, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 169, 170 (2001); 
see also Laurie Ristino & Sam Kalen, Is Environmental Law Serving Society, NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENVT., Spr. 2012, at 52, 52 (“The environmental law of the future must 
incorporate energy, food, transportation, land use, and water, just to name a few.  And it 
must do so unconstrained by our existing, arguably simplistic, federalist, regional, and 
local models”). 
264 Many of these proposals to expand the reach of environmental concerns in the law 
invoke the principle of sustainability as a conceptual foundation.  See, e.g., Robert L. 
Glicksman, Sustainable Federal Land Management: Protecting Ecological Integrity and 
Preserving Environmental Principal, 44 TULSA L. REV. 147, 151 (2008); Neil D. 
Hamilton, The Role of Law in Promoting Sustainable Agriculture: Reflections on Ten 
Years of Experience in the United States, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 423 (1998); John R. 
Nolon, Comparative Land Use Law: Patterns of Sustainability, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
855 (2006).  The ambiguity of the related terms sustainability and sustainable 
development have led some scholars, however, to doubt their usefulness as conceptual 
anchors.  See Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward A 
New Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 64 (2000) (“The problem with the 
sustainable development concept is that it is subject to a variety of interpretations.”); 
Glicksman, supra, at 148 (“The various formulations of sustainability have been 
criticized as, among other things, vague, slippery, oxymoronic, a ‘mask[er] [of] failed 
consensus,’ and a reflection of political correctness.”) (footnotes omitted); J.B. Ruhl, Law 
for Sustainable Development: Work Continues on the Rubik's Cube, 44 TULSA L. REV. 1, 
1-2 (2008) (noting that the concept of sustainable development is in part “window 
dressing,” “a way of masking over problems,” “a way of demanding more than is 
possible,” and “a way of promising more than is possible,” “which goes a long way 
toward explaining why it has become so powerful a policy concept”). 
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Moreover, integrating environmental concerns into new areas of 
law that currently unintentionally yet significantly affect the environment 
will require a better integration of environmental concerns with other 
policy objectives.265  The environmental law canon, by design, focuses 
overwhelmingly on environmental concerns.  Although statutes within the 
canon usually mandate some balance between environmental protection 
and other non-environmental goals, the intent and effect of such balancing 
is merely to moderate the stringency of environmental protection so as to 
mitigate other adverse non-environmental regulatory impacts, not to 
affirmatively pursue other goals.  For example, Clean Air Act § 202 
directs EPA to establish emissions standards for new motor vehicles 
“which reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable” while 
“giving appropriate consideration to cost, energy, and safety factors.”266 
The inclusion of cost, energy, and safety as factors for EPA to consider 
may lead EPA to moderate the stringency of the emission reduction it 
requires pursuant to § 202, but in doing so § 202 is merely mitigating its 
impacts on these factors, not affirmatively promoting them—§ 202 
considers safety, but it is not a safety regulation.267  Unintentional 
environmental laws, however, do pursue and promote other, non-
environmental objectives.  As a result, adding environmental concerns into 
unintentional environmental laws will require integrating environmental 
and non-environmental goals in a way that the environmental law canon 
has not attempted. 
Embedded environmental law may offer a better model than 
canonical environmental law for pursuing environmental protection in the 
frontier areas outside of the traditional domain of environmental law.  
Whereas canonical environmental law gives environmental protection 
primacy and is segregated from other, nonenvironmental law, embedded 
environmental law integrates substantively and institutionally with 
nonenvironmental law.268  The environmental policies that result from 
                                                 
265 Cf. John C. Dernbach, Achieving Sustainable Development: The Centrality and 
Multiple Facets of Integrated Decisionmaking, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 247 
(2003) (arguing that integrated decisionmaking—decisionmaking that integrates 
environmental and other objectives—is the foundation of sustainable development). 
266 Clean Air Act § 202(a)(3)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i). 
267 Canonical environmental statutes do, however, sometimes contain individual 
provisions that pursue objectives entirely independent of the statute’s overall 
environmental protection goal.  Clean Water Act § 513, 33 U.S.C. § 1372, for example, 
requires paying laborers and mechanics constructing treatment works using federal grants 
under the Clean Water Act be paid prevailing wages.  It is a labor law, administered by 
the Labor Department, but otherwise embedded in an environmental statute. 
268 NEPA, by requiring federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impacts of their 
proposed actions even when those actions are taken pursuant to non-environmental 
statutes, does some of the work of integrating environmental concerns into non-
environmental law.  But NEPA’s requirements are purely procedural not substantive—it 
requires agencies only to consider the environmental effects of their proposed actions, not 
to give any weight to environmental concerns.  See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens 
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). This significantly limits NEPA’s efficacy and makes 
the statute an imperfect substitute for substantive environmental requirements. Cf. The 
 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OUTSIDE THE CANON 54 
such an integration will no doubt depart from the dominant model of the 
environmental law canon, but that can be a positive development.  
Delegating environmental authority to non-environmental agencies, for 
example, could serve as an important step toward inculcating 
environmental values in agencies that have not tended to view 
environmental protection as an important objective within their programs.  
For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has 
relied on statutory authority in the form of embedded environmental 
provisions to require new public housing to comply with energy efficiency 
standards.269 
3. Climate Change 
The massive and “super wicked”270 problem of anthropogenic 
climate change looms over all other environmental issues.  Despite the 
legislative paralysis on the issue,271 EPA is moving forward with 
addressing climate change under its existing statutory authorities, 
primarily the Clean Air Act.272  But no one believes that current laws, 
even if they are better than nothing, offer the best policy mechanisms for 
addressing climate change. 
The dominant proposals to date have involved some type of 
statutory program that would regulate greenhouse gas emissions in a form 
resembling the statutes of the environmental law canon, such as a cap-and-
                                                                                                                         
National Environmental Policy Act 40th Anniversary Symposium, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,183, 11,195 (2010) (transcribing an unidentified audience member’s 
comment that “NEPA is procedural, it is in many instances window-dressing”). 
269 See 42 U.S.C. § 12709 (requiring Secretary to establish standards); id. 
§ 12745(a)(1)(F) (requiring compliance with standards); see also General Accountability 
Office, GAO-09-46, Green Affordable Housing (2008) (concluding that HUD had taken 
“positive steps” to promote energy efficiency but could do more within its existing 
authority). 
270 See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the 
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159-60 (2009) (explaining 
that climate change is a “super wicked problem” because of its “enormous 
interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders,” because “the 
longer it takes to address the problem, the harder it will be to do so,” because “”those 
who are in the best position to address the problem . . . [have] the least immediate 
incentive to act,” and because of “the absence of an existing institutional framework of 
government with the ability to develop, implement, and maintain the laws necessary to 
address a problem of climate change's tremendous spatial and temporal scope”); see also 
Kelly Levin et al., Playing It Forward: Path Dependency, Progressive Incrementalism, 
and the “Super Wicked” Problem of Global Climate Change 5-7 (June 3, 2010), available 
at 
http://environment.yale.edu/uploads/publications/2007levinbernsteincashoreauldWicked-
Problems.pdf (originating the term “super wicked” and applying it to the problem of 
climate change). 
271 See generally Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Climate Bill 
Effort, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2010; Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, New Yorker, Oct. 
11, 2010; Elizabeth Kolbert, Uncomfortable Climate, NEW YORKER, Nov. 22, 2010.  
272 See EPA, Climate Change:  Regulatory Initiatives, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/regulatory-initiatives.html.  
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trade emissions program administered by EPA.273  Such a program has not 
been viable politically at the national level. 
Moreover, some academics, policy analysts, and environmental 
advocates have questioned whether a global system of conventional 
pollution regulation is the best model for addressing climate change.  
Some of these critics argue that conventional environmental regulation is 
ill-suited to the unprecedented challenges that climate change poses, and 
instead favor a strategy of quickly moving the economy toward the use of 
low-carbon energy sources through direct public investment in 
technological innovation.274  Others are less critical of conventional 
regulation, but advocate for sector-specific policies as an alternative to a 
system that universally regulates greenhouse gas emissions.275 
Alternative approaches of these types—direct investment or sector-
specific regulation—could take the form of embedded environmental 
laws.  Such programs could be designed to take advantage of the best 
features of embedded environmental laws:  dispersed, relatively small 
programs that reduce the political stakes and facilitate experimentation 
and context-specific policy solutions. 
First, relatively small climate change programs dispersed 
throughout government would have potentially greater political viability 
than a universal emissions system of regulation administered by EPA.  
Much of the private sector already regards EPA as heavy handed and 
draconian in its orientation and is likely to regard EPA regulation with 
particular suspicion and with a proclivity and history of organizing 
political opposition to the agency’s initiatives.  The private sector is more 
likely to be open to initiatives from other agencies.  Many other agencies, 
especially sector-specific agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, 
Department of Transportation, and Department of Energy, administer a 
wide variety of programs, both regulatory and non-regulatory, many of 
which proactively assist the sector.  Like other embedded environmental 
                                                 
273 See Resources for the Future, Summary of Notable Market-Based Climate Change 
Bills Introduced in the 111th Congress (May 12, 2010), 
http://www.rff.org/Documents/Features/111th%20_Legislation_Table_Graph.pdf.   
274 See, e.g., HOWARD LATIN, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY FAILURES:  WHY 
CONVENTIONAL MITIGATION APPROACHES CANNOT SUCCEED (2012); MCKINSEY & CO., 
PATHWAYS TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY 32-34, 59-129 (2009); TED NORDHAUS & 
MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, THE EMERGING CLIMATE CONSENSUS: GLOBAL WARMING 
POLICY IN A POST-ENVIRONMENTAL WORLD (2009), available at http:// 
www.thebreakthrough.org/blog/PDF/EmergingClimateConsensus.pdf;. 
275 See, e.g., PEW CTR. FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, POLICIES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS 
FROM THE TRANSPORTATION SECTOR 3 (2008) (arguing that “sector-specific measures to 
promote energy efficiency and low carbon technologies may be needed to ensure 
significant GHG reductions from transportation”); Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, 
Toward an International Aviation Emissions Agreement, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. Rev. 351, 
385 (2012) (arguing in favor of an international greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
agreement specific to the aviation sector); Jake Schmidt et al., Sector-Based Approach to 
the Post-2012 Climate Change Policy Architecture, 8 CLIMATE POLICY 494 (2008) 
(arguing the advantages of a sector-based approach). 
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laws, climate policies could be integrated into broader programs that 
pursue a variety of objectives. 
Second, dispersed climate change programs could facilitate 
experimentation and context-specific policy solutions better than a 
centralized system of universal emissions regulation.  Such a strategy 
could involve broad policy principles coordinated across government, but 
implemented through sector-specific policies administered by sector-
specific agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, Department of 
Transportation, and Department of Energy.  In the absence of 
comprehensive policy, specific climate policies could be used to 
experiment with various strategies that could be utilized to implement 
future comprehensive regulation.  For example, agricultural policies that 
nudge farms toward less carbon-intensive energy consumption could 
mitigate the impacts of an eventual comprehensive cap-and-trade or 
carbon tax that would significantly raise the cost of carbon-intensive fuels. 
Regardless whether dispersed sector-specific climate policies 
would supplement or substitute for a system of universal climate 
emissions regulations, dispersed climate policies in the form of embedded 
environmental laws could by virtue of their distinct functional features 
provide significant benefits beyond what a universal uniform regulatory 
system could attain. 
III. Understanding Environmental Law 
In addition to offering a model for environmental lawmaking that 
provides a potentially important alternative to the environmental law 
canon, noncanonical environmental laws can generate important 
conceptual insights.  In particular, noncanonical environmental laws, by 
virtue of their location at the periphery of the field of environmental law, 
can offer illumination into some of environmental law’s existential issues. 
A. Expanding the Recognized Domain 
Including noncanonical environmental laws in the study of 
environmental law expands the recognized domain of environmental law 
beyond the canon that currently predominates in the field.  Bringing 
environmental laws from outside of the canon into the study of 
environmental law broadens the scope of laws associated with the field 
overall.  This more expansive view of environmental law reveals the 
field’s topography to be more varied than it appears from conventional 
viewpoints that focus solely on the canon.  Embedded environmental laws, 
for example, evidence that environmental law has been produced in forms 
and at times quite different than the canon of major regulatory programs 
that arose during the Environmental Revolution of the 1970s.276   
                                                 
276 See supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text (noting that embedded environmental 
laws have been enacted during times in which canonical environmental lawmaking has 
not been active). 
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Expanding the scope of recognized environmental law beyond the canon 
thus reveals the form of the canon—including the problems it addresses, 
the institutions it has created, and the regulatory mechanisms it employs—
to be a contingent product of a particular historical moment.  The 
environmental law canon is not merely the result of Americans embracing 
environmental values, but rather also involved a series of choices 
regarding how to embody environmental values in the law.  Embedded 
environmental laws thus can remind us of the underappreciated diversity 
of ways in which law can pursue environmental protection.  To borrow 
John Witt’s observations in a different context, conventional accounts of 
the development of environmental law often “tacitly assume a determinate 
relation between a particular course of social change . . . and a particular 
regime or doctrinal structure” in environmental law.277  Embedded 
environmental laws counteract a tendency to assume the inevitability or 
essentiality of the environmental law canon. 
B. Central and Peripheral Cases 
At a deeper conceptual level, noncanonical environmental laws can 
provide material for the exploration of some of the central questions about 
the field to an extent that environmental laws within the canon cannot do 
by themselves.  To see how, we can analogize the distinction between the 
environmental law canon and noncanonical environmental laws to the 
distinction in legal philosophy drawn between a central case and a 
peripheral or limit case. 
Scholars of legal philosophy exploring the concept of law have 
differentiated between law in its central case, which lies at the heart of the 
category of law, and law in its peripheral or limit case.278  Here, a central 
case is an instance of something within a category that exhibits all the 
features properly associated with the category; a peripheral case does not 
have all of these features, but enough of them to fall within the 
category.279  Although there is disagreement about the extent to which 
productive analytical inquiry should focus on central cases versus 
peripheral cases, there seems to be some agreement that considering both 
types of case in combination facilitates the appreciation of the overall 
                                                 
277 See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 9 (2004) (stating his thesis that 
“both of the conventional historical accounts [of the development of modern American 
accident law] tacitly assume a determinate relation between a particular course of social 
change (industrialization) or a new intellectual development (changing ideas about 
causation) and a particular regime or doctrinal structure in accident law”). 
278 See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW & NATURAL RIGHTS 9-11 (2d ed. 2011); John 
Gardner, Nearly Natural Law, 52 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (2007).  Finnis traces the central case 
concept to Aristotle’s focal meaning and Max Weber’s ideal-type.  Finnis, supra, at 9. 
279 JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 150 (1999) (contrasting “typical cases” 
in which the signature traits of a category “are manifested to a very high degree” and 
“borderline cases” “in which all or some [traits] are present only to a lesser degree”). See 
Gardner, supra note 278, at 21 n.25 (“There are various limit cases in which one or the 
other of these features is lacking, while others remain.”). 
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category to its fullest.  Thus, John Finnis contends that one can move from 
an examination of the central case to an examination of peripheral cases 
that “trace[s] the network of similarities and differences, the analogies and 
disanalogies, . . . between them and the central cases.”280  And John 
Gardner notes that neglecting either the central case or peripheral cases 
leads to analyses that “provide[] only a partial account of their subject.”281 
For the field of environmental law, the canon represents a type of 
central case, and noncanonical environmental law a peripheral case.282  
Like the central case, the canonical environmental statutes exhibit all the 
features associated with environmental law—national pollution statutes 
enacted primarily for the purpose of protecting the environment and 
administered by EPA—with the notable exception of NEPA and the 
Endangered Species Act.283  Noncanonical environmental laws, on the 
other hand, have enough features associated with the field that they are 
recognized as environmental law—most notably, a goal of environmental 
protection—but do not exhibit many of the features otherwise associated 
with the field.284 
Despite its location at the periphery of the field, however—indeed, 
because of its location at the periphery of the field—noncanonical 
environmental law is crucial to understanding environmental law overall, 
including canonical environmental law.  For example, noncanonical 
environmental laws raise, in a much more acute way than the statutes in 
the environmental law canon, the question of what is environmental and 
what is not.   
C. Blurring the Boundaries 
The field of environmental law is generally defined to encompass 
laws with a goal of environmental protection or limiting ecological 
impacts.285  But precisely what objectives fall within this category is 
                                                 
280 Finnis, supra note 278, at 11. 
281 Gardner, supra note 278, at 32. 
282 Scholars who have used the central-versus-peripheral case framework have tended to 
attach a direct normative superiority to the central case.  See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 
278, at 5 (describing the central case as “the case that shows how the other cases . . . 
ought to be”).  But one can move from the normative, wherein the central case represents 
what the category ought to be, to the descriptive, wherein, for example, the central case 
represents what the category is generally thought to be.  Of course, even identifying 
certain characteristics of a law as salient makes an indirectly evaluative judgment, insofar 
as it indicates that those characteristics are important to a normative evaluation of the 
law.  See JULIE DICKSON, EVALUATION AND NORMATIVE THEORY 51-67 (2001). 
283 See supra Part I.B.2. 
284 See supra Part II.B. 
285 See supra note 23; see also, e.g., CRAIG N. JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION OF 
THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (2d ed. 2007) (“Environmental Law is law designed to protect the 
environment, and the plants and animals that rely on it, including us.”); LAZARUS, supra 
note 9, at 1 (“[E]nvironmental law regulates human activity in order to limit ecological 
impacts that threaten public health and biodiversity.”); Michael C. Blumm, Studying 
Environmental Law: A Brief Overview and Readings for a Seminar, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. 
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unclear.  Traditional notions of what constitutes nature or the environment 
have been criticized as based on naïve visions “of a pristine nature that 
exists apart from people.”286 
Statutes within the environmental law canon tend not to clarify the 
issue, because their goals of protecting environmental public health and 
ecological concerns reside at the core of environmental law.  The 
environmental-ness of these statutes is so obvious that we need not—and 
generally do not—explain how they are environmental.  With respect to 
many environmental laws outside the canon, however, the environmental-
ness is not so straightforward or clear:   
 Energy Efficiency.  Congress originally enacted fuel economy 
standards for vehicles as part of the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act of 1975 to reduce demand for oil during the Oil 
Shock of the 1970s.287  Subsequent amendments to the statute—
like energy policy generally—have to some extent incorporated 
environmental protection.288 
 Safety Statutes.  Statutes such as the Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Act289 and the Pipeline Safety Act290 regulate to 
protect against accidents that threaten public safety.  Accidents 
involving hazardous materials or pipelines clearly have adverse 
environmental effects, but the statutory purposes refer only to 
protection of “life and property.”291 
 Food Safety.  The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FFDCA)292 includes provisions that regulate food safety.293  One 
such provision, enacted as part of the Food Quality Protection 
                                                                                                                         
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 309, 310 (1992) (“Environmental law is a loose amalgam of 
common law and (increasingly) statutory provisions designed to protect public health, 
ecosystems, and dependent animal and plant species.”). 
286   Keith Kloor, Environmentalists Are Battling Over the Nature of Nature, SLATE, Dec. 
12, 2012; see also William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the 
Wrong Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND:  RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 69 
(William Cronon, ed., 1996). 
287 See Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA), § 2, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 
Stat. 871, 874 (1975). 
288 See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), 121 Stat. 1492 (2007).  
The EISA, although still focused on energy independence and security, includes among 
its aims references to concerns that are clearly environmental—for example, “clean 
renewable fuels” and “greenhouse gas capture and storage.”  121 Stat. at 1492. 
289 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5128. 
290 49 U.S.C. §§ 60101-60140. 
291 See 49 U.S.C. § 5101 (“The purpose of this chapter is to protect against the risks to 
life, property, and the environment that are inherent in the transportation of hazardous 
material in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.”); 49 U.S.C. § 60102(a) (“The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide adequate protection against risks to life and property 
posed by pipeline transportation and pipeline facilities by improving the regulatory and 
enforcement authority of the Secretary of Transportation.”). 
292 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399d. 
293 21 U.S.C. §§ 341-350l-1. 
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Act’s294 amendments to the FFDCA, directs EPA to establish 
tolerances for pesticide residues in food.295  Pesticide tolerances 
are directed at the same public health goal as other food 
regulations in the FFDCA, such as prohibitions against false or 
misleading labeling on foods.296  Pesticide use does, however, have 
significant environmental implications, which are regulated under 
other statutes.297 
 Invasive species.  Invasive species can have devastating ecological 
consequences.298  The Plant Protection Act, which aims to prevent 
the spread of invasive plant pests and weeds, mentions 
environmental protection as a goal,299 but focuses primarily on 
impacts on agriculture. 
 Conservation.  Some conservation, such as the national parks 
system,300 seems obviously to fall within the ambit of 
environmental protection.  Other statutes, however, contemplate 
conservation for the purpose of maintaining supplies of a natural 
resource for future commercial exploitation.301  Still other laws fall 
somewhere in between.302  Whether laws that pursue conservation 
                                                 
294 Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996). 
295 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b). 
296 21 U.S.C. § 343. 
297 See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 136-136y. 
298 See, e.g., Thoms H. Fritts & Dawn Leasman-Tanner, The Brown Treesnake on Guam: 
How the Arrival of One Invasive Species Damaged the Ecology, Commerce, Electrical 
Systems, and Human Health on Guam: A Comprehensive Information Source (U.S. 
Geological Survey, 2001), available at 
http://www.fort.usgs.gov/resources/education/bts/bts_home.asp (noting the proliferation 
of non-native brown tree snakes on Guam has wiped out much of the island’s population 
of birds and small mammals); H.R. 6311, The Nonnative Wildlife Invasion Prevention 
Act:  Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans of the H. 
Comm.  on Natural Resources, 110 Cong. 31 (2008) (statement of Marc Gaden, Ph.D., 
Legislative Liaison, Great Lakes Fishery Commission) (noting the sea lamprey “laid 
waste to the [Great Lakes] fishery after it invaded the Upper Great Lakes in the 1920s”). 
299 7 U.S.C. § 701(1) (finding that “the detection, control, eradication, suppression, 
prevention, or retardation of the spread of plant pests or noxious weeds is necessary for 
the protection of the agriculture, environment, and economy of the United States”). 
300 For example, the National Park Service Organic Act directs the Park Service to 
manage national parks, monuments, and reservations “to conserve the scenery and the 
natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of 
the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the 
enjoyment of future generations.”  National Park Service Organic Act § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 1. 
301 A 1955 statute, for example, authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to assist the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in controlling and draining water from anthracite mine 
formations to “conserve natural resources,” because “the presence of large volumes of 
water in anthracite coal formations involves serious wastage of the fuel resources of the 
Nation.”  30 U.S.C. § 571. 
302 For example, the Department of Agriculture’s soil conservation programs tie the 
abatement of soil erosion to a variety of concerns, some environmental and some not, 
although the program focuses overall on maintaining agricultural productivity.  16 U.S.C. 
590a (“[I]t is declared to be the policy of Congress to provide permanently for the control 
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are environmental laws may depend on what resource is being 
conserved and for what purpose. 
As these examples illustrate, considering noncanonical 
environmental laws both clarifies and muddies efforts to define what it 
means for a law to be an environmental law.  On the one hand, focusing 
on the limit cases of the field (noncanonical environmental laws) can lead 
us to posit what seems to be a plausible conceptual delineation of the 
field’s boundary:  environmental laws intentionally regulate human causes 
of ecological disruption.  On the other hand, the fact that many 
noncanonical environmental laws also seem to lie as well within other 
recognized fields—such as transportation or agriculture—strongly 
indicates that environmental law, especially at its periphery, overlaps 
considerably with related fields.  Environmental law, from this viewpoint, 
does not so much as end as it does fade into other, overlapping fields. 
D. Practical Implications 
The question of what is environmental has considerable practical 
as well as theoretical import.  What is categorized as environmental—as 
opposed to agricultural, for example—matters because the classification of 
an issue as environmental affects the institutions that are called upon to 
address it (e.g., which congressional committee, which agency), the 
interest groups that mobilize to support or oppose it, the regulatory model 
assumed for creating law to address the issue, and even the theoretical 
approaches to analyzing the issue. 
The Swampbuster provision offers an example.  Although the 
provision was enacted to conserve wetlands—a type of environmental 
protection—Congress enacted the Swampbuster as part of the Food 
Security Act,303 a farm bill that went through the House Agriculture 
Committee304 and Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 
Committee305; was delegated to the Department of Agriculture for 
implementation; and took the form of a condition on farm subsidies rather 
than a direct restriction.  The same objective of wetlands conservation 
could be pursued—and has been pursued306—in the form of 
environmental legislation that would go through the House Resources 
Committee and Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, 
delegated to an environmental agency for implementation, and in the form 
of a direct restriction on the use of wetlands. 
                                                                                                                         
and prevention of soil erosion to preserve soil, water, and related resources, promote soil 
and water quality, control floods, prevent impairment of reservoirs, and maintain the 
navigability of rivers and harbors, protect public health, public lands and relieve 
unemployment . . . .”). 
303 Pub. L. No. 98-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985). 
304 See H.R. Rep. No. 99-271(I), at 78, 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1103, 1180. 
305 See S. Rep. No. 99-145, 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1676, 1969-70. 
306 See Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (establishing a permit program for 
discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States—a program that 
regulates the filling of wetlands). 
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Occupational exposure to toxic substances provides another 
example.  The Occupational Safety and Health Act307 treats occupational 
exposure to toxic substances as an employment law issue, enacted by 
legislation that goes through the congressional labor committees, governed 
by a statute implemented by the Department of Labor.  The Toxic 
Substances Control Act,308 however, treats the same problem as an 
environmental law issue, enacted by legislation that goes through the 
congressional environmental committees and is implemented by EPA. 
Recognizing that the boundaries of environmental law are blurry 
not sharp, and that many situations arising within environmental law—
especially those outside of the canon—also arise within other fields, 
broadens the array of potential regulatory options for responding to 
environmental problems. Policy advocates and lawmakers decide—
usually implicitly—about whether to frame an issue as environmental or 
as something else.  Making that decision deliberately could create 
opportunities for laws that are more reflective of messy realities and better 
tailored to our complex needs. 
Indeed, full appreciation of the overlap between environmental 
issues and other areas of law might induce exploration of how new legal 
structures can develop to reflect these blurry boundaries and overlapping 
legal fields.  Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi, for example, have examined 
how agencies can beneficially exercise coordinated concurrent regulatory 
jurisdiction—what they call “shared regulatory space.”309  Freeman and 
Rossi’s discussion of shared regulatory space, including the tools agencies 
can use to coordinate their overlapping regulatory jurisdictions and 
methods of assessing and improving coordination, is illuminating and 
instructive.  They do not, however, discuss the ways in which overlapping 
boundaries of substantive legal fields—for example, environmental law 
and safety law—create an impetus for shared regulatory space, or how the 
design of shared regulatory space should reflect overlapping legal 
fields.310  More work is needed to develop legal structures and institutions 
with, for example, capability to address issues that implicate multiple 
fields, objectives, and perspectives. 
IV. Conclusion 
The history of environmental law over the last four decades in the 
United States provides cause for both optimism and pessimism about the 
field’s future.  The existing major environmental statutes that comprise the 
canon of environmental law have accomplished significant improvements 
in environmental quality while proving resilient in the face of sometimes 
harrowing political headwinds.  On the flip side, however, the canon has 
                                                 
307 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678. 
308 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2695d. 
309 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 189. 
310 Cf. Aagaard, supra note 196, at 281-85 (arguing that issues perceived to arise within 
multiple legal fields will and should tend to lead to overlapping regulatory jurisdictions). 
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calcified over time, proving resistant to reform and difficult to employ 
against emerging environmental threats. 
If it is to succeed in protecting human health and the environment, 
the environmental law of this new century may need to evolve into 
something that looks quite different than the extant environmental law 
canon.  The next generation of environmental laws must be viable for 
creation and implementation even in an antagonistic political climate; 
amenable to integration with other, non-environmental law; and able to 
make inroads against the monumental peril of global climate change.  
Environmental laws embedded in larger non-environmental programs 
offer an alternative model to the environmental law canon—an alternative 
model that seems well suited to a new generation of environmental law. 
The major federal pollution statutes that comprise the 
environmental law canon will continue to form the centerpiece of 
American environmental law for the foreseeable future.  But other 
environmental laws outside of the canon, and especially embedded 
environmental laws, have the potential to play a much greater role in 
environmental policy going forward.  Such embedded environmental laws 
exhibit features quite different from the canonical environmental statutes:  
whereas major environmental statutes are large regulatory programs 
administered by EPA and focused on environmental protection, embedded 
environmental laws are dispersed, relatively small programs that often 
integrate environmental protection with other objectives.  These features 
create important functional differences between the environmental law 
canon and embedded environmental laws, differences that in some 
circumstances give embedded environmental laws advantages over 
canonical environmental laws.  The small size and narrow scope of 
embedded environmental laws, for example, facilitate experimentation and 
context-specific policy solutions.  Embedded environmental laws can sow 
the seeds of future broader changes in the law and can enlist the 
participation of new institutional actors with fresh perspectives and 
additional resources. 
Studying embedded and other noncanonical environmental laws 
also broadens and deepens our understanding of environmental law as a 
legal field.  Noncanonical environmental laws are environmental laws but 
usually not only environmental laws—they also are labor laws, agriculture 
laws, or transportation laws as well.  Environmental law should reflect this 
complicated and messy reality.  Attempting to maintain a set of 
environmental laws segregated substantively and institutionally from other 
fields unduly constrains the project of environmental law, which in its 
essence should seek to suffuse environmental concerns into the law 
generally.  Environmental effects are everywhere in the law, so 
environmental concerns should be spread throughout the law as well. 
